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Proposed AML Amendments & Credit Unions

Jon 1Today’s guest blogger is Jonathan Krumins, Vice-President, AML Risk & Compliance, at vCAMLO Solutions Inc. vCAMLO provides anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-terrorist financing (ATF) support to Canadian credit unions. You can learn more about vCAMLO at www.vcamlo.ca.

Background

On July 4, 2015, draft amendments to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR) were published in the Canada Gazette. These changes are not yet in force, and are open to public comment until September 4, 2015. The proposed changes are based on requirements set out by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body that sets out international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. For this reason, we expect the final version of these amendments to be similar to the draft text.

2015 Proposed PCMLTFR Amendments and Credit Union Specific Analysis (Line By Line)

Why Do These Changes Matter to Credit Unions?

The proposed changes will have a direct impact on a Credit Union’s AML obligations, including record keeping, member identification and ongoing monitoring requirements. Some of the more significant changes include new member identification methods, expanded definitions (and requirements) for Politically Exposed Persons, and new record keeping requirements for “reasonable measures” taken.

New Member Identification Methods          

IdentificationThe draft regulations will require identification documents to contain a member’s name and photograph. This will exclude SIN cards and birth certificates as acceptable identification documents, and may pose an issue when identifying seniors whose passport or driver’s license has long since expired.

The amendments also provide a number of new identification methods that can be used to identify members both face-to-face and non-face to face. These new methods are an improvement on existing rules, which are currently more restrictive.

For example, a Canadian credit file meeting certain criteria could now be used to identify a member. Many credit unions perform credit checks as part of their account opening process, so this could be used in place of government-issued identification in certain circumstances, or would allow simple non-face to face identification.

Also added is the ability to rely on information from “a reliable source” (yet to be determined, but likely online databases and other web-based resources), and information confirming that an individual has a deposit account, credit card or other loan account with another credit union, bank or caisse populaire. A credit union will also be able to accept identification performed by another credit union.

Politically Exposed Persons

PEFP silhouette 1The proposed regulations have added new categories of Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs), as follows:

  • Close associates of Politically Exposed Foreign Persons (PEFPs)
  • Politically Exposed Domestic Persons (PEDPs), their family members and close associates
  • Heads of International Organizations (HIOs), their family members and close associates

Given that the list (contained in bill C-31) of qualifying positions for PEDPs includes mayors, it is likely that many if not most credit unions will have members classified as PEDPs. The draft regulations mitigate this somewhat by adding a prescribed period of 20 years to the definition of a PEDP.

Additionally, required measures for PEPs such as determining the source of funds, obtaining senior management authorization to keep an account open, and performing enhanced monitoring will only apply to PEDPs and HIOs (and their family members and close associates) who have been determined to be high risk. Despite these exceptions, identifying and documenting these new categories of PEP will add to credit unions’ compliance obligations.

Reasonable Measures

Many AML record keeping, reporting and determination requirements rely on “reasonable measures” to be taken by financial institutions. For example, in a Large Cash Transaction Report, certain information about the conductor of the transaction, such as their country of residence, their home and business telephone numbers are not mandatory, but reasonable efforts must be made to obtain the information, and if you have it on file, it must be included in the report. The proposed changes will mean that whenever you take “reasonable measures”, and the measures taken are unsuccessful, you will then need to keep a record describing what the measures were and the reason they were unsuccessful. This will require additional work and record keeping for categories such as FINTRAC reporting, PEP determinations and correspondent banking relationships, among others.

Public Comments

Public comments about the proposed changes will be accepted by the Ministry of Finance until September 4, 2015. They must be submitted in writing, as follows:

Mail       Attention: Lisa Pezzack

Director, Financial Systems Division

Department of Finance

90 Elgin Street

Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G5

Email: fcs-scf@fin.gc.ca

Need a Hand?

If you would like someone to look over your submission before you make comments to the Department of Finance, you can get in touch with us free of charge. We will look over your submission and make suggestions, without any cost to you. If you need a hand, please feel free to contact vCAMLO or Outlier.

Above And Beyond What?

It seems that every time I’m at a conference or event related to compliance, I hear people talking about going “above and beyond” the requirements. Something about this statement has always seemed wrong to me. It wasn’t until recently that I understood why: most of us aren’t getting the basics right.

FINTRAC Examination Data

 

Most Of Us Are Failing At The Basics

This is not an indictment of Compliance Officers and the tremendous effort that goes into compliance. It’s a simple statistical fact.

We crunched some numbers by industry for anti-money laundering (AML) compliance in Canada based on information obtained from the regulator through an access to information request in 2014. The rate of examinations for which there were no deficiencies (across all reporting entity types) was 17 percent. While we congratulate the savvy few that met this bar, that leaves 83 percent of reporting entities that failed to meet the basic requirements in some way.

While these results are specific to examinations conducted by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), it’s not unreasonable to assume that the results can be generalized to compliance more broadly.

Shift The Focus

Before anyone can go “above and beyond” the fundamentals should be solid. One of the most painful reviews (like an audit for compliance) that I’ve conducted was a classic case of going above and beyond while completely missing the mark on baseline compliance. The reporting entity had great technology and related risk ranking metrics. The methods that they used to understand customer behavior involved machine learning and geo-location data at each login, analyzed over time. It was a great risk management strategy, except that they hadn’t identified a single customer in accordance with the law. Not a single one…

Ironically, in working to design measures that went beyond the basic compliance requirements, they found themselves so far outside of what was allowable under the law that had an examination been conducted by a regulator at the time, they could have been facing a very hefty penalty (as was the case for Ripple Labs in the USA).

Rework

Consequently, they spent a good deal of time and money updating their systems and identifying customers. In some cases, customers were lost. The (re)identification process was frustrating for people that believed that they had already completed everything that was needful in order to transact freely. There were updates to process documents and IT systems that took place over the course of months, and a good deal of frustration at the rework involved.

A competent third party or in house expert can be useful in assisting with system and process design, provided that they are able to understand your business model, basic compliance requirements and how to achieve these in the most elegant way possible.

Keep It Simple (Seriously)

At a recent conference, I was listening to a speaker whom I consider a model for what not to do, both functionally and ethically. As he sweepingly gestured towards an overly complex chart, he stared into the blank faces of his audience and proclaimed “It’s ok if you don’t get it. That’s not the point. The point is that I should look impressive. Are you impressed?” I was not.

Which model fits your needs?

Which model fits your needs?

Remember that the people that are usually fulfilling your compliance requirements are your frontline staff. Would they be able to use the model to the left to risk rank your customers?

While it can be tempting to create complex rating systems, it’s important to understand that your compliance program should be functional. If the system that you’ve created is too complex for your staff to understand and adhere to, it will fail. Whether you’re hiring someone external or creating your program in-house, remember to keep it as simple and easy to follow as possible.

Ask, Check, Test

One of the many arguments that I’ve heard for going above and beyond is that this is helpful when dealing with regulators and banking service providers. While I agree that this can certainly be the case, it’s a moot point if the basic requirements are not met.

In my experience, both regulators and bankers are candid – when asked – about where their expectations are set. There is no real appetite on the part of either to create a set of secret standards related to going above and beyond. From a practical perspective, this means that reporting entities should be focused on understanding the basic requirements, and seeking clarification as needed.

Effectiveness reviews can also be a useful tool in this regard, provided that the reviewer or auditor is well versed in local compliance requirements. Similarly, internal testing should be geared towards baseline requirements to ensure that these are being met.

Opportunities & Innovation

Going above and beyond for its own sake (in terms of compliance) is neither required, nor particularly good business.

This is not to say that reporting entities should avoid innovation. Rather, these efforts should be focused and prioritized on finding the most cost-effective and efficient ways to meet baseline compliance requirements, and mitigating risk.

Changing compliance legislation can also provide opportunities for innovation, in particular where there are public consultations. This type of dialogue with lawmakers allows stakeholders to suggest alternatives that may mitigate risk in new and innovative ways. It provides an opportunity to showcase new technologies and processes that solve common compliance problems with greater efficiency (although they may not fit into the current regulatory paradigm).

Need A Hand?

We believe that good compliance is good business. If you have questions, please feel free to contact us.

AML Regulation Updates & Digital Currency

Amber AML Program_2On July 4th, 2015, draft amendments to Canada’s Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations were published in the Canada Gazette. These updates are intended to, among other things, strengthen Canada’s anti-money laundering (AML) regime and address certain technical issues. The draft does expand the definition of a money services business (MSB) to include “dealers in digital currency,” but digital currency businesses may still consider submitting comments related to the draft, as the consultation period of 60 days is open to the public.

This round of amendments didn’t include ‘dealers in digital currency’ – so why should you comment?

While dealers in digital currency are not yet regulated as MSBs, it is reasonable to expect that this is the direction Canada is taking based on Bill C-31, which was passed last year. This means that the regulations could apply to digital currency businesses in the near future. The 60-day comment period is likely to be the only public comment period before a final version of the amended regulations is published.

One of the most significant changes in the current draft relates to customer identification. The current customer identification methods for non-face-to-face customers (which apply to all online MSB customers) are complicated and heavily reliant on an individual having at least six months of Canadian credit history (you can learn more here). The proposed amendments have the potential to broaden the range of available sources to include sources other than credit reporting bureaus.

Digital currency businesses should consider commenting on these amendments. While we at Outlier consider the changes to be positive overall, we’re aware that there are many identification solutions on the market (many of which don’t meet the current Canadian identification requirements). This has caused more than a few headaches for businesses that operate online. While the proposed changes may alleviate some of the current pain points, businesses should consider how these fit with your business model and service providers.

Customer Identification Measures

In the text below, the text that is struck through includes proposed deletions, while the green text includes proposed additions. You can also see a full marked-up version of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations here.

MEASURES FOR ASCERTAINING IDENTITY

  1. (1) In the cases referred to in sections 53, 53.1, 54, paragraph 54.1(a) and sections 55, 56, 57, 59, 59.1, 59.2, 59.3, 59.4, 59.5, 60 and 61, a person’s the identity of a person shall is to be ascertained, at the time referred to in subsection (2) and in accordance with subsection (3), in the following manner:

(a) By referring to the person’s birth certificate, driver’s licence, provincial health insurance card (if such use of the card is not prohibited by the applicable provincial law), passport or other similar document; or

(a) By referring to identification document that contains their name and photograph and that is issued by the federal government or a provincial government or by a foreign government other than a municipal government, and by verifying that the name and photograph are those of the person;

(b) if the person is not physically present when the account is opened, the credit card application is submitted, the trust is established, the client information record is created or the transaction is conducted,

(i) by obtaining the person’s name, address and date of birth and

(A) confirming that one of the following entities has identified the person in accordance with paragraph (a), namely,

(I) an entity, referred to in any of paragraphs 5(a) to (g) of the Act, that is affiliated with the entity ascertaining the identity of the person,

(II) an entity that carries on activities outside Canada similar to the activities of a person or entity referred to in any of paragraphs 5(a) to (g) of the Act and that is affiliated with the entity ascertaining the identity of the person, or

(III) an entity that is subject to the Act and is a member of the same association as the entity ascertaining the identity of the person, and

(B) verifying that the name, address and date of birth in the record kept by that affiliated entity or that entity that is a member of the same association corresponds to the information provided in accordance with these Regulations by the person, or

(ii) subject to subsection (1.3), by using one of the following combinations of the identification methods set out in Part A of Schedule 7, namely,

(A) methods 1 and 3,

(B) methods 1 and 4,

(C) methods 1 and 5,

 (D) methods 2 and 3,

(E) methods 2 and 4,

 (F) methods 2 and 5,

(G) methods 3 and 4, or

(H) methods 3 and 5.

 (b) by referring to information concerning them that is received by the     person or entity that is ascertaining their identity on request from a federal or provincial government body — or a body that is acting as the agent or mandatary of such a body — that is authorized in Canada to ascertain the identity of persons, and by verifying that either the name and address or the name and date of birth contained in the information are those of the person;

(c) by referring to information that is contained in the person’s credit file — if that file is located in Canada and has been in existence for at least      three years — and by verifying that the name, address and date of birth   contained in the credit file are those of the person;

(d) by doing any two of the following:

(i) referring to information from a reliable source that contains their name and address, and verifying that the name and address are those of the person,

(ii) referring to information from a reliable source that contains their name and date of birth, and verifying that the name and date of birth are those of the person, or

(iii) referring to information that contains their name and confirms that they have a deposit account or a credit card or other loan account with a financial entity, and verifying that information; or

(e) by confirming that one of the following entities previously ascertained their identity in accordance with any of paragraphs (a) to (d), and by verifying that the name, address and date of birth contained in the entity’s record are those of the person:

(i) an entity that is referred to in any of paragraphs 5(a) to (g) of the Act and that is affiliated with the entity that is ascertaining the person’s identity, 

(ii) an entity that carries on activities outside Canada similar to the activities of a person or entity referred to in any of paragraphs 5(a) to (g) of the Act and that is affiliated with the entity that is ascertaining the person’s identity, or

(iii) a financial entity that is subject to the Act and that is a member of the same financial services cooperative or credit union central as the entity that is ascertaining the person’s identity.

(1.1) In the case referred to in paragraph 54.1(a), the identity of a person shall be ascertained by a person or entity, at the time referred to in subsection (2) and in accordance with subsection (3),

(a) by referring to the person’s birth certificate, driver’s licence, provincial health insurance card (if such use of the card is not prohibited by the applicable provincial law), passport or other similar document; or

(b) where the person is not physically present when the credit card application is submitted,

(i) by obtaining the person’s name, address and date of birth and

(A) confirming that one of the following entities has identified the person in accordance with paragraph (a), namely,

(I) an entity, referred to in any of paragraphs 5(a) to (g) of the Act, that is affiliated with the entity ascertaining the identity of the person,

(II) an entity that carries on activities outside Canada similar to the activities of a person or entity referred to in any of paragraphs 5(a) to(g) of the Act and that is affiliated with the entity ascertaining the identity of the person, or

(III) an entity that is subject to the Act and is a member of the same association as the entity ascertaining the identity of the person, and

(B) verifying that the name, address and date of birth in the record kept by that affiliated entity or that entity that is a member of the same association corresponds to the information provided in accordance with these Regulations by the person,

(ii) subject to subsection (1.3), by using a combination of any two identification methods referred to in either Part A or Part B of Schedule 7, or

(iii) subject to subsection (1.3), where the person has no credit history in Canada and the credit limit on the card is not more than $1,500, by using combination of any two identification methods referred to in any of Parts A, B and C of Schedule 7.

(1.1) For the purposes of subparagraphs (1)(d)(i) to (iii), the information that is referred to must be from different sources, and the person whose identity is being ascertained and the person or entity that is ascertaining their identity cannot be a source.

(1.2) for the purposes of paragraphs (1)(b)(i) and (1.1)(b)(i), an entity is affiliated with another entity if one of them is wholly owned by the other or both are wholly owned by the same entity.

(1.2) The person or entity that is ascertaining the identity of a person who is at least 12 years of age but not more than 15 years of age may refer under subparagraph (1)(d)(i) to information that contains the name and address of one of the person’s parents or their guardian or tutor in order to verify that the address is that of the person.

(1.21) For the purposes of subparagraphs (1)(b)(i) and (1.1)(b)(i),

(a) a financial services cooperative and each of its members that is a financial entity are considered to be members of the same association; and

(b) a credit union central and each of its members that is a financial entity are considered to be members of the same association.

(1.3) A combination of methods referred to in sub-paragraph (1)(b)(ii) or (1.1)(b)(ii) or (iii) shall not be relied on by a person or entity to ascertain the identity of a person unless

(a) the information obtained in respect of that person from each of the two applicable identification methods is determined by the person or entity to be consistent; and

(b) the information referred to in paragraph (a) is determined by the person or entity to be consistent with the information in respect of that person, if any, that is contained in a record kept by the person or entity under these Regulations.

(1.3) If a document is used to ascertain identity under subsection (1), it must be original, valid and current. Other information that is used for that purpose must be valid and current and must not include an electronic image of a document.

(2) The identity shall be ascertained

(a) in the cases referred to in paragraph 54(1)(a) and subsection 57(1), and paragraph 60(a), before any transaction other than an initial deposit is carried out on an account;

(b) in the cases referred to in section 53, paragraph 54(1)(b), subsection 59(1) and paragraphs 59.3(a), 59.4(1)(a), 59.5(a), 60(b) and 61(b), at the time of the transaction;

(b.1) in the case referred to in section 53.1, before the transaction is reported as required under section 7 of the Act;

(b.2) in the case referred to in paragraph 54.1 (a), before any credit card is activated;

(c) in the cases referred to in paragraphs 55(a), (d) and (e), within 15 days after the trust company becomes the trustee;

(d) in the cases referred to in subsection 56(1) and paragraph 61(a), within 30 days after the client information record is created;

(e) in the cases referred to in paragraphs 59.1(a) and 59.2(1)(a), at the time of the transaction; and

(e.1) in the case referred to in paragraph 60(a), before any funds are disbursed; and

(f) in the case referred to in subsection 62(3), at the time a contribution in respect of an individual member of the group plan is made to the plan, if

(i) the member’s contribution is not made as described in paragraph 62(3)(a), or

(ii) the existence of the plan sponsor has not been confirmed in accordance with section 65 or 66.

(3) Unless otherwise specified in these Regulations, only original documents that are valid and have not expired may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining identity in accordance with paragraph (1)(a) or (1.1)(a).

64.1 (1) A person or entity that is required to take measures to ascertain a person’s identity under subsection 64(1) or (1.1) may rely on an agent or mandatary to take the identification those measures described in that subsection only if that person or entity has entered into an agreement or arrangement, in writing, with that agent or mandatary for the purposes of ascertaining identity.

(2) A person or entity that enters into an agreement or arrangement referred to in subsection (1) must obtain from the agent or mandatary the customer information obtained by the agent or mandatary under that agreement or arrangement.

(2) The person or entity may rely on measures that were previously taken by an agent or mandatary to ascertain the person’s identity if the agent or mandatary was, at the time they took the measures,

(a) acting in their own capacity, whether or not they were required to take the measures under these Regulations; or

(b) acting as an agent or mandatary under a written agreement or arrangement — entered into with another person or entity that is required to take measures to ascertain a person’s identity — for the purposes of ascertaining identity under subsection 64(1).

(3) In order to rely on measures taken by an agent or mandatary under subsection (1) or (2), the person or entity shall

(a) have entered into a written agreement or arrangement with the agent or mandatary for the purposes of ascertaining a person’s identity under subsection 64(1);

(b) obtain from the agent or mandatary all of the information that the agent or mandatary used to ascertain the person’s identity; and

(c) be satisfied that the information is valid and current and that the agent or mandatary ascertained the person’s identity in the manner described in any of paragraphs 64(1)(a) to (d).

64.2 Every person or entity that is required under these Regulations to ascertain a person’s identity in connection with a record that the person or entity has created and is required to keep under these Regulations — or in connection with a transaction that they have carried out and in respect of which they are required to keep a record under these Regulations or under section 12.1 of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Suspicious Transaction Reporting Regulations — shall set out on or in, or include with, that record the person’s name and the following information:

(a) if the person or entity referred to an identification document under paragraph 64(1)(a), the type of document referred to, its reference number and the issuing authority and, if available, the place it was issued and its expiry date; 

(b) if the person or entity referred to information under paragraph 64(1)(b), the source of the information, the type of information referred to, a reference number associated with the information and the date on which the person or entity verified the information;

(c) if the person or entity referred to information under paragraph 64(1)(c), the source of the information, the reference number associated with the search of the credit file and the date on which the person or entity verified the information;

(d) if the person or entity referred to information under paragraph 64(1)(d), the source of the information, the type of information referred to and the account number contained in it — or if there is no account number contained in it, a reference number associated with the information — and the date on which the person or entity verified the information; or

(e) if the person or entity confirmed under paragraph 64(1)(e) that another entity had previously ascertained the person’s identity, the name   of that entity, the manner in which it previously ascertained the person’s identity under any of paragraphs 64(1)(a) to (d), the applicable information set out in one of paragraphs (a) to (d) of this section that is associated with that manner of ascertaining identity and the date on             which the person or entity verified the information.

Submit comments by September 12, 2015

Comments must be submitted in writing during the comment period, either by email or snail mail:

Snail Mail:

Lisa Pezzack, Director Financial Systems Division,

Financial Sector Policy Branch Department of Finance

90 Elgin Street Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G5

Email:

fcs-scf@fin.gc.ca

Need a Hand?

At Outlier, we believe that it is important to participate in decisions that affect you and your business.  If you would like someone to look over your submission before you make comments to the Department of Finance, you can get in touch with us free of charge.  We will look over your submission and make suggestions, without any cost to you.  If you need a hand, please feel free to contact us.

 

Proposed PCMLTFR Updates

Screen Shot 2015-07-08 at 4.03.31 AM

We’ve created a marked-up version of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR) that reflects the draft amendments posted in the Canada Gazette on July 4th, 2015.

Here’s a printable and downloadable PDF file: PCMLTFR Mark-Up (July 4, 2015 Draft Amendments)

If you would like a copy of the file in Microsoft Word, please contact us.

Need A Hand?

At Outlier, we believe that it is important to participate in decisions that affect you and your business.  If you would like someone to look over your submission before you make comments to the Department of Finance, you can get in touch with us free of charge.  We will look over your submission and make suggestions, without any cost to you.  If you need a hand, please feel free to contact us.

Draft AML Regulations Will Be Released July 4th

Canadian Flag

Where Can You See The Draft Regulations?

Amendments to Canada’s Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR) will be published this Saturday, July 4th, 2015 in the Canada Gazette.  There will be a 60 day comment period, open to all stakeholders.

Who Should Comment & Why Does It Matter?

We expect that the draft amendments will include, among other things, the inclusion of ‘dealers in digital currency’ as money services businesses (MSBs), and updates to the methods that can be used to identify customers in a non-face-to-face environment.

If you are a regulated entity under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA), including:

  • Financial entities;
  • Life insurance;
  • Securities dealers;
  • Money services businesses;
  • Accountants;
  • Real estate;
  • Casinos;
  • Dealers in precious metals and stones; and
  • British Columbia notaries,

or if you are a digital currency business, the proposed amendments are likely to have an impact on the way that you do business.

The 60 day comment period is intended for stakeholders to submit meaningful feedback that can shape the law, and provide insight for lawmakers on how the regulations will impact Canadian businesses.

How Do You Comment?

Comments must be submitted in writing (either on paper or electronically).

Snail Mail:

Attention:  Lisa Pezzack

Director, Financial Systems Division

Department of Finance

90 Elgin Street

Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G5

Email:

fcs-scf@fin.gc.ca

Make Your Voice Heard

These are the only official means to submit comments.  We highly encourage all stakeholders to participate in this process.

Need A Hand?

At Outlier, we believe that it is important to participate in decisions that affect you and your business.  If you would like someone to look over your submission before you make comments to the Department of Finance, you can get in touch with us free of charge.  We will look over your submission and make suggestions, without any cost to you.  If you need a hand, please feel free to contact us.

Suspicious Transaction Reporting in 2015

Preparing for a FINTRAC examination

At the Canadian Institute’s 14th Annual AML Forum, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) reviewed its expectations for suspicious transaction reporting. FINTRAC emphasized that suspicious transaction reports (STRs) are vital to the agency’s mandate as Canada’s financial intelligence unit (FIU) and ongoing collaboration with law enforcement agencies. While reporting entities (REs) in Canada have been required to report transactions for quite a few years, we’ve had many questions from REs about what FINTRAC expects and looks for in examinations. FINTRAC’s most recent guidance is useful in tuning your technology, enhancing your processes, and asking the right questions at industry association meetings.

What is FINTRAC Looking for in STRs?

When FINTRAC conducts compliance examinations, they will be applying three tests to STR data, including:

  1. Entity Practitioner: FINTRAC will look for transactions that are similar to those involved in STRs that you have reported. If there are similar transactions or transaction patterns that have not been reported to FINTRAC, there should be an explanation for the difference. Where possible, this explanation should be documented.
  2. Sector Practitioner: FINTRAC will compare the number and type of STRs submitted by similar entities. The size and type of business are taken into consideration.
  3. Reasonable Practitioner: FINTRAC will analyze a sample of reported STRs and unreported transactions against relevant guidance. In this case, relevant guidance means the suspicious transaction indicators from FINTRAC’s Guideline 2 that are applicable to your business.

These are terms that we’re likely to hear more about over the coming months, and there are compliance program adjustments (most of them relatively simple) that can be made to ensure that you’re meeting this standard.

Tune Your Technology

Amber looking at laptop FINTRAC screen

Most REs use software solutions to detect potentially suspicious transactions. Almost all transaction monitoring software uses some type of rules-based system to determine when alerts should be generated. These rules should, at minimum, reflect the indicators that are applicable to your business. Not all of the indicators from FINTRAC’s Guideline 2 will be applicable to your business. Where possible, you should document the decisions that you make about your transaction monitoring rules, including the rationale for those decisions.

The most sophisticated software platforms have machine learning functions. These can take the decisions that have been made about previous alerts and use this information to refine how the program works. For example, if a particular pattern of transactions was deemed to be suspicious, the program may look for similar patterns.

If you’re not using software that does this on its own, don’t panic. You can review the STRs that you’ve submitted to FINTRAC to determine whether your transaction monitoring rules are tuned to reflect the types of money laundering and terrorist financing threats that you’ve previously encountered. This should be done on a regular basis (for example, as part of your Risk Assessment updates). If you have an STR that is related to a pattern that you don’t have a rule to cover, you may want to do this sooner, rather than waiting for the next scheduled update.

Train Your Staff

Training

Over the years, I’ve heard many Compliance Officers express frustration about not knowing whether or not STR data has been useful to FINTRAC or law enforcement. To close this gap, I’ve looked for articles and speakers from FINTRAC and law enforcement that could provide meaningful information about the type of information that is most useful. The same principle applies to your staff.

You can use existing cases (you’ll want to remove any personal information for training purposes) to demonstrate the type of transactions that you want your staff to escalate to compliance for review. Existing cases from the media, and end to end cases provided by training companies like TAMLO, are also excellent resources. Keeping your annual training fresh is a challenge, and using your STRs as cases is one way to do that, while also meeting FINTRAC’s expectations.

Refine Your Audits & Effectiveness Reviews

AML Compliance Effectiveness Review

Are your auditors and/or reviewers using the same tests that FINTRAC is using to assess your compliance? If you’re not certain, ask.

If you perform self-assessment testing, you may want to include these tests as well.

As of 2015, all AML Compliance Effectiveness Reviews performed by Outlier will use these three key tests to assess STR data.

Ask Your Industry & Working Groups for More

Hanshake

Most REs have excellent industry associations and working groups such as the Canadian Banker’s Association (CBA), Canadian MSB Association (CMSBA) or the Canadian Jewellers Association (CJA). These groups are excellent resources and can help you understand STR trends across your industry. If you’re not a member, you may still be able to attend regular conferences or events.

Need A Hand?

We would love to hear from you. If there are topics that you would like to know more about, or if you need assistance with your compliance program, please contact us.

FINTRAC Examination Results for MSBs

The Canadian Money Services Business Association (CMSBA) recently held their Spring Training events in Montreal, Vancouver and Toronto.  The list of speakers included MSB industry professionals, as well as representatives from regulators including the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC).  For a full synopsis of the Montreal and Toronto events, click here.  FINTRAC presented excellent statistical data about how MSBs have fared in examinations conducted between April 2011 and July 2014.  So how are MSBs faring?  Very well overall. 

ZDE FINTRAC 2008-2013

Data obtained through a freedom of information request indicates that almost 25% of MSBs examined between 2008 and 2013 have not had any deficiencies.

How Does FINTRAC Decide Who Is Examined?

FINTRAC considers several factors when deciding which reporting entities (REs) will be examined.

  • Concurrent Examinations: examinations conducted in tandem with the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI). This is applicable to federally regulated financial entities (FRFEs) like banks.
  • Market Share: The largest reporting entities in Canada (because the larger an organization is, the more critical the risk of non-compliance will be);
  • Cyclical: Coverage of a whole industry (this seemed to apply most to Casinos).
  • Follow-Up: Subsequent examinations based, with an emphasis on the resolution of deficiencies found in previous examination(s) to ensure remediation. FINTRAC noted that although it is no longer a requirement to submit a formal action plan to FINTRAC, it is a best practice for REs to document (and update) an action plan internally.
  • Risk: FINTRAC’s evaluation of the RE’s risk, based on a broad selection criteria, such as money laundering and terrorist financing vulnerabilities, the likelihood of non-compliance and industry trends.
  • Theme-Based: Related to specific intelligence about a RE or type of business that indicates there may be an elevated risk of non-compliance, money laundering vulnerability or terrorist financing vulnerability.

Methodology & Analysis

FINTRAC’s statistical analysis of MSB adherence to the requirements laid out in the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA) and its regulations is broken down by percentage, the results of the exams conducted that were fully compliant, partially compliant and non-compliant.  These are colour coded:

  • Green: fully compliant (no deficiencies were observed),
  • Yellow: partially compliant (there was something in place, but the MSB missed something), and
  • Red: non-compliant (in most cases, there was nothing in place or a reporting timeframe was missed).

Overall examination results have been positive.

Overview

It’s noteworthy that if FINTRAC has, as of 2014, found something during an examination that is considered ‘immaterial’, it’s not cited.  For example, in a large sample, if there are two client addresses that appear to be PO boxes, but all other client addresses were complete and in acceptable formats, there may not be a citation.  In these cases, FINTRAC may inform the RE verbally, but it will not be part of the formal ‘findings’ letter.

Compliance Officer

MSBs are required to have a Compliance Officer (a person that is responsible for overseeing the AML & ATF compliance program).  The appointment of the Compliance Officer must be documented in writing.  FINTRAC staff chided that this is likely the easiest area to achieve a fully compliant result in examinations.  MSB examination results certainly reflected this.

CO Chart

From a total of 612 MSB examinations considered, 608 MSBs were fully compliant.

Only four MSBs were deemed to be non-compliant.  It was noted that these were generally new market entrants that did not appear to understand Canadian AML & ATF compliance requirements.

Policies and Procedures

MSBs are required to have policies and procedures.  Policies describe the MSB’s regulatory obligations, while procedures describe what the MSB is doing to meet those requirements.  These must be documented, in writing, and the procedures must cover both staff and agents (if the MSB has agents).

PP Chart

From a total of 765 MSB examinations considered, 477 MSBs were fully compliant.

In 230 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  Common errors included:

  • The omission of the 24-hour rule (specific descriptions of how the MSB determined whether or not reportable transactions had occurred over a 24 hour period),
  • Third party determinations (specific descriptions of when an MSB must determine if there is a third party involved, as well as what information needs to be collected and recorded), and
  • Politically exposed foreign person (PEFP) determinations (specific descriptions of when an MSB must determine if their client is a PEFP, and if so, what information needs to be collected/recorded. There is also a requirement that senior management signoff on the account within 30 days of the determination).

A total of 55 MSBs did not have any documented policies or procedures. In some cases, FINTRAC noted that there appeared to be processes in place, but that these were not documented in writing.

Training

MSBs are required to have an ongoing training program. The training program must be documented (who, what, where, when and how) and delivered to all staff and agents on an annual basis, at minimum.

Training Chart

From a total of 487 MSB examinations considered, 346 were fully compliant.

In 63 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  Common errors included:

  • Interviews conducted with staff during an examination that evidenced a misunderstanding of the requirements (during an exam, FINTRAC will interview random staff members related to regulatory requirements to ensure training effectiveness)

In 78 examinations, MSBs did not have any training in place, or if they did, it was not documented.

Among the training options available to MSBs, we’re most excited about a relatively new offering from TAMLO that includes fast paced and visually stunning video content, as well as testing and tracking tools for Compliance Officers.

AML Compliance Effectiveness Review

MSBs are required to complete an AML Compliance Effectiveness Review once every two years.  The review must cover all policy and procedure documentation, as well as operational testing to ensure procedures are being properly followed.

2YR Chart

From a total of 722 MSB examinations considered, 412 were fully compliant.

In 101 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  Where MSBs missed the mark was typically because they did not respect the two year cycle.  Other common errors included:

  • Only reviewing the policy documents with no operational testing of whether they are being followed (the policy document tells staff and agents what to do. Procedures tell them how to do it.  MSBs must be sure they are testing whether staff and agents are adhering to the procedures).

In 209 examinations, MSBs had not conducted an effectiveness review or could not provide evidence of one taking place.

Risk Assessment

MSBs are required to assess the risk that their business could be used for money laundering or terrorist financing.  The risk assessment must include four key components:

  • Products, services and delivery channels;
  • Geography;
  • Customers; and
  • Any other relevant factors.

Risk must be assessed and scored, and mitigated by appropriate controls.

RA Chart

From a total of 720 MSB examinations considered, 432 were fully compliant.

In 158 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  The main issue was failing to include one of the four required elements. In some cases, a risk assessment was in place, but the documentation was not sufficient in assessing the MSB’s risk and controls.

In 129 examinations, MSBs had no evidence of a risk assessment.

FINTRAC noted that additional industry-specific risk assessment guidance is expected to be published later this year.

MSB Registration

MSBs are required to register with FINTRAC, as well as update their information within 30 days if there are any changes to business activities, banking or agent information.

MSB Reg Chart

From a total of 591 MSB examinations considered, 230 were fully compliant.

In this category, no partially compliant ratings were provided (the MSB registration was either complete, accurate and up to date, or it was deemed to be non-compliant).

In 361 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be non-compliant.  Most issues were due to a failure to update information when something within the business had changed or a failure to list all business activities. For example, the MSB registration may indicate that an MSB only performed foreign exchange in a case where remittance services were also provided.

Client Identification

MSBs are required to identify their clients in certain situations.  There are prescribed methods for completing this both in person and non-face-to-face (NF2F), and the identification document (ID) information must be recorded.

Client ID Chart

From a total of 796 MSB examinations considered, 621 were fully compliant.

In 64 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  Common errors included:

  • Unacceptable ID (such as health card in Ontario);
  • Accepting ID that was expired at the time of the transaction (identification documents must be valid, or not expired, at the time they are reviewed);
  • Failing to record the prescribed details of the ID used (when reviewing a client’s ID, MSBs must keep a record of certain prescribed information); and
  • In Non-Face-To-Face Identification situations, only using one method, or using an unacceptable combination of methods (when identifying a customer who is not physically present, there are prescribed methods of how this is to be accomplished).

In 111 examinations, MSBs were non-compliant with client identification requirements.

Record Keeping

MSBs are required to keep certain records related to transactions and client identification.  These records must be stored in a manner that they can be accessed in the event they are requested, and must be maintained for at least five years.

RK Chart

From a total of 811 MSB examinations considered, 470 were fully compliant.

In 300 examinations MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  In these cases, record keeping was taking place but elements of the record keeping requirements were being overlooked.  Common issues included:

  • Missing telephone numbers;
  • Vague occupation information (for example “manager” or “worker”);
  • PO boxes recorded as customer addresses;
  • Missing postal codes;
  • Third party determinations that were incomplete; and
  • Payment methods for incoming and outgoing payments.

In 41 examinations, MSBs were non-compliant with record keeping requirements.

Third Party Determinations

MSBs are required to make a third party determination in certain prescribed circumstances, as well as collect and record certain information (name, address, date of birth, occupation and relationship to your client) about the third party.

TPD Chart

The total number of MSBs included in the review was not provided, with the statement: “there was not enough information available to conduct reasonable analysis”.  However, the total number of non-compliant MSBs was 6, indicating that approximately 600 MSB examinations were considered in this sample.

FINTRAC Reporting

When FINTRAC assesses reporting obligations, it uses the internal acronym “QTV”, which stands for quality, timing and volume.  Quality refers to the information in the report, specifically, if the report has all the required information.  Timing simply means, was the report filed within the designated timeframe.  Volume is slightly more complicated, but mainly refers to the amount of reports you have filed compared to your previous submissions.  It was noted that typically, where MSBs were deemed partially compliant, it was due to the quality.  Where non-compliance was related to the timing.

Electronic Fund Transfers Reports

MSBs are required to submit electronic funds transfer (EFT) reports to FINTRAC within 5 business days from the date the transaction took place.  An EFT includes the international transfer of CAD 10,000 or more, either in a single transaction, or multiple transactions within a 24-hour period.

EFT Chart

From a total of 434 MSB examinations considered, 165 were fully compliant.

In 87 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant. MSBs were typically failing to include all required information, such as:

  • Phone number;
  • Date of birth; or
  • Postal code.

It is noteworthy that while not all fields are marked as required in F2R, all fields must be filled in if the MSB has recorded the information.

In 182 examinations, MSBs were deemed non-compliant, with most not reporting the EFTs within the specified time frame, and a small portion missing EFT reports.

Large Cash Transaction Reports

MSBs are required to submit large cash transaction (LCT) reports to FINTRAC within 15 calendar days from the date of the transaction, if the transaction was CAD 10,000 or more in cash, either in a single transaction, or multiple transactions within a 24-hour period.

LCTR Chart

From a total of 428 MSB examinations considered, 232 were fully compliant.

In 104 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  MSBs were typically failing to include all required information, such as:

  • Occupation;
  • Date of birth;
  • Postal code; or
  • Type of ID used to identify the client.

In 92 examinations, MSBs were non-compliant, with most not reporting the LCTs within the specified time frame, and a small portion missing LCT reports.

Suspicious Transaction Reports

MSBs are required to submit suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and attempted suspicious transaction reports (ASTRs) to FINTRAC within 30 calendar days from the date the transaction is deemed suspicious by the Compliance Officer.

STR Chart

From a total of 285 MSB examinations considered, 262 were fully compliant.

In 14 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  In these cases, MSBs were typically failing to include all required information.

In 9 examinations, MSBs were non-compliant.  Failing to file STRs carries relatively sever penalties, as the Canadian intelligence community relies on this type of reporting to build cases.  Where items are escalated as being potentially suspicious (either by staff or a transaction monitoring system), MSBs should always document the reason that these items are deemed not to be suspicious if no STR or ASTR reporting is completed.

Need a Hand?

If you are an MSB that needs compliance assistance (or a bank that wants assistance in setting up and maintaining a compliance regime that effectively manages MSB related risk), please contact us.

 

 

 

Insights From the CMSBA Education Days

We were fortunate enough to be able to attend the Canadian MSB Association (CMSBA)’s Montreal and Toronto spring training days. For Money Services Businesses (and those affiliated with the industry), the CMSBA is an excellent resource for collaboration, information sharing and advocacy. For those that were not able to attend any of the spring training sessions, here’s a roundup of the topics covered.

FINTRAC & MSB Compliance Examinations

Canada’s federal regulator for anti-money laundering (AML), the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), provided in depth statistics related to compliance examinations, as well as common issues for MSBs. Despite what some highly publicized administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) may lead you to believe, MSBs are faring well as a sector in FINTRAC’s compliance examinations. It’s noteworthy that through a freedom of information request, Outlier obtained data on the number of MSBs that did not have any deficiencies in examinations. Between 2008 and the end of 2014, this amounted to approximately 25% of all MSBs examined. In most cases, MSBs were largely compliant, with some partial deficiencies.

Overview Big

For a complete breakdown of common issues noted in examinations, click here.

AMF, Respondents & Digital Currency

Québec’s provincial regulator, the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), provided clarification on its expectations for MSB respondents. For MSBs dealing with customers in Québec that do not have offices in the province, a respondent must be nominated to deal with the AMF on the MSB’s behalf. Among the requirements are that the respondent must:

  • Be over 18 years old;
  • Have an address in Québec (home address or business address); and
  • Not be under tutorship, curatorship or advisorship.

The AMF also addressed digital currency, noting that not all digital currency business models are covered by the Québec MSB Act, and that there must be an element of fiat currency involved in the transactions. Both the AMF’s press release from February 2015 and the current presentation confirmed that digital currency trading platforms (that include fiat currency transactions) and digital currency ATMs are considered in scope. As there are a myriad of other digital currency related business models, if you are unsure of where you fit, you can contact the AMF and receive a decision (we recommend that you request a decision in writing where possible).

Agency Agreements

I had the honour of speaking about MSB agency agreements (the agreements between MSBs and their agents) with Susan Han (previously of AUM Law). Like most things, agent agreements should be documented in writing and clearly spell out the terms of the agreement. MSBs that take on agents should understand that the MSB would bear most of the risk (financial, compliance and reputational). Agents should be aware that the client (and information about the client) “belongs” to the MSB rather than the agent (and this information should always be provided to the MSB when it is requested).

International Collaboration & De-Risking

The CMSBA has partnered with MSB associations worldwide to increase awareness of the negative ways in which de-risking (which CMSBA Director Ken Saul noted should be called de-banking) affects the financial system. As the de-risking issue has affected MSBs worldwide, and there does not appear to be any effective solutions under consideration, a whitepaper was developed and presented to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This whitepaper has received a positive reception. Stay tuned for more on the international efforts in this regard.

One of the few Canadian Financial Institutions that (openly) banks MSBs, Luminus Financial, was on hand to discuss factors that MSBs should consider when dealing with banking relationships. MSBs should be prepared to provide complete and transparent information about their business. In order to achieve success in both obtaining and maintaining banking relationships, MSBs should be able to demonstrate that they are compliant and present information in a way that is well organized and addresses all of the questions and requests that the bank has made. In some cases, this will be a higher standard than simply meeting the minimum compliance requirements set out in law and regulation.

Compliance Maturity Model

In looking proactively at issues related to de-risking and demonstrating compliance, the CMSBA is working to develop a compliance maturity model (CMM). Currently, CMSBA members can complete the first stage of this model by completing an attestation form online. The attestation states that the MSB is compliant with applicable legislation and not subject to administrative or criminal proceedings. Questions, comments or suggestions related to the CMM can be directed to cmsba-cmm@canadianmsb.org.

Need a Hand?

If you are an MSB that needs compliance assistance (or a bank that wants assistance in setting up and maintaining a compliance regime that effectively manages MSB related risk), please contact us.

 

Who Wins The De-Risking Shell Game?

BankRisk_2The volume of evidence, both empirical and anecdotal, grows every day. The story on the surface is simple enough: banks are making the decision to “de-risk” (a polite way to say close the account of) certain types of businesses including money service businesses (MSBs) and digital currency businesses that are considered “too risky” by traditional financial services providers. The unintended consequences have included strained remittance corridors and frustration for businesses struggling to get by without reliable banking services. While these consequences are well documented, there are other unintended consequences of the de-risking phenomenon that have been less widely discussed. These include a growing lack of transparency between some industries and their banking service providers and directly threatens our ability to effectively manage money laundering and terrorist financing risk at both the financial institution and national levels.

It’s a shell game of “hide the risk” – and we’re all losing.

Businesses Are Losing

By now, if you haven’t heard about businesses struggling to survive without access to banking facilities, you would have had to ignore financial media for the past two years. The global effects of de-risking have attracted the attention of the G-20, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the World Bank, and many more. While it’s clear that there are issues in terms of access to banking, let’s be honest with one another: while some businesses will close up shop, many others will take a different track.

Whether it’s using alternative financial service providers, payment processors, personal bank accounts or merely opening accounts at other financial institutions without revealing the true nature of the underlying activity, businesses will find a way to carry on. I’ve spoken personally to businesses that have taken these approaches, and it has never been their first or most ideal choice. These aren’t criminals carrying on some nefarious business! They are entrepreneurs who would rather be able to provide their real business plan to their banks and explain their activity honestly, but they do not believe that this option is open to them.

Banks Are Losing

Consequently, a bank with a policy that prohibits these types of businesses from holding accounts will deal with businesses that have gone to great lengths to conceal the true nature of their activity. The banks are unaware of the true nature of the activity passing through their accounts, and therefore ill equipped to manage the risk related to these activities. The strain on banking resources must be phenomenal, as banks must constantly devise new ways to interpret patterns of customer activity to detect undeclared MSB or digital currency activity. While it isn’t easy to quantify these costs, I can only surmise that the cost of this detective work must be high, despite being ineffective.

To further muddy the waters, businesses who fail to provide transparent information to their banks for fear of de-risking may also conduct completely legal activities in a way that starts to look like criminal activity. For example, if you believe that your business banking relationship is not reliable, you may open many accounts (in some combination of personal and business names) and conduct fractions of your banking through each, transferring funds from one account to another as needed to meet your obligations. On the surface, it can seem much like “layering” or “structuring” activity (techniques used by money launderers to make funds more difficult to trace). This further adds to the banks’ burden by creating more activity that must be monitored and investigated.

Entire Nations Are Losing

It has been widely publicized that in some cases like Somalia, entire nations that are dependent on remittance payments from friends and family living and working abroad are experiencing increased difficulty. Reliable and cost-effective remittance payment providers are a shrinking pool. This seems absurd in a time when technology can facilitate a payment in seconds.

National Security Is Losing

It’s not just far-flung places dependent on remittance payments that are losing. Here at home, we have a national security system that is dependent on our financial intelligence units (FIUs) having access to reliable data. The reliability of that data is undermined at every level by the de-risking shell game:

  • Businesses do not declare the true nature of their activity – and there are no incentives for them to do so;
  • Banks do not understand the nature of their customers’ activities, making it difficult detect potentially criminal activity; and
  • There is likely to be an increase in “false positives”, where activity conducted by businesses that do not believe that they can reveal the true nature of their activity to their banks instead conduct business in a manner that resembles criminal money laundering techniques.

Taken together, this results in the likelihood that key information is not being reported to FIUs correctly. Consequently, it becomes more difficult for law enforcement and other national securities to rely on this data to perform their roles effectively.

Who Is Winning?

There are two potential winners in this game and much like the shell games that you see duping tourists on the streets of large cities, neither is without malevolent intent.

The first are unregistered/unlicensed MSB businesses. These are businesses that have ignored regulatory requirements and carried on business without any FIU reporting. In some cases, these businesses will even minimize their interaction with the local financial system by using foreign bank accounts (and point of sale terminals) to collect customer funds. While the risk of penalty is high, the reward for these businesses (in particular where they are able to complete transactions that pose a challenge for their compliant counterparts) can also be high.

The second is criminal organizations. When legitimate businesses are performing transactions that look like money laundering, detecting true criminal activity becomes exponentially more difficult. I can only assume that the criminals are laughing all the way to the bank.

Shutting Down The Shell Game

De-risking is a complex problem with complex outcomes, but the solution need not be complicated. It does, however, involve the cooperation of all levels of the financial services community: regulators, banking service providers and businesses.

The costs and benefits of de-risking need to be reassessed. Where banking service providers are capable of accepting and managing accounts for businesses considered to be “higher risk”, they should do so, with their regulator’s blessing. Rather than perpetuating the shell game, regulators should encourage banking service providers to manage risk (and provide solid guidance with reference to how this should be done). Finally, there should be open communication between banking service providers, regulators and business banking customers. The lines of communication closed by de-risking must be opened, allowing banks to have honest conversations that will provide real insight into their customers’ business and lead to effective long-term risk management.

Micro Deposits & Micro Withdrawals

The Big DisclaimerAmber looking at laptop blank screen

We’re not lawyers and nothing that we write should be considered a legal opinion. Whether or not a solution will be acceptable to your regulators will always depend on your implementation and documentation – please contact us if you need help with either.

Background

There are a limited number of ways for Canadian reporting entities to identify individuals without meeting face to face. Previously, we have sought opinions from the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) on whether or not micro deposits and micro withdrawals could be used to confirm a customer’s identity. Until recently, the answer had been no. We reached out to FINTRAC again on the issue after learning that technology had evolved in a way that could meet the requirements. We’re pleased to share with you that FINTRAC is of the opinion that – given the right technology conditions – micro deposits and micro withdrawals can indeed be used to confirm a customer’s identity.

Confirmation Of A Deposit Account

The methods that can be used to confirm a customer’s identity are listed in Schedule 7 of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR). (Since this post was written, Schedule 7 has been repealed and replaced by FINTRAC’s Methods to Identify Individuals). The “Confirmation of a Deposit Account Method” involves confirming that the person has a deposit account (this means a chequing or savings type of account) with a Canadian financial entity (this means a bank, credit union or caisse populaire). To use this method, reporting entities must keep a record of the name of the financial entity where the account is held, the account number and the date of the confirmation.

The key elements of this method involve determining that the account belongs to the person that you are trying to identify and determining that the account is indeed a chequing or savings type of account.

Micro Deposits and Micro Withdrawals

Previously, micro deposits and micro withdrawals were viewed as failing on both of these key elements. Confirming the amount of a micro transaction proved that a person had access to the account, but not that they owned the account. It was also viewed as impossible to determine the type of account (for instance the account may have been a line of credit that had a similar account number structure).

Fortunately, technology has advanced and some payment processors are able to conduct name matching (in some cases, payments are even stopped if there isn’t a match) as well as the type of account. Not all payment processors may have the capabilities, but if you’re looking for a way to automate some of your non face-to-face customer identification, this could be an option.

Implementation Checklist

We’ve broken down the implementation into seven key questions. If you’re able to answer yes in each case, you’re likely to be ready to implement micro deposits or micro withdrawals as an identification method.

  1. Does my payment processor conduct name matching (our client’s name against the account being debited or credited) and what confirmation do we receive of a match?
  2. Is our system set up to keep a record that demonstrates that the name was matched?
  3. Does my payment processor have access to the account type when an account is being debited or credited and can they pass that information to us and/or confirm for us that the account is a deposit account?
  4. Is our system set up to keep a record of the type of account or confirmation that the account is a deposit account?
  5. Is our system set up to keep a record of the name of the financial entity where the account is held?
  6. Is our system set up to keep a record of the account number?
  7. Is our system set up to keep a record of the date of the confirmation?

In addition to this list, you should also give some thought to what happens when identification fails (for example if the name doesn’t match or the account isn’t the right type). You’ll need to consider an alternative way to identify your client, and you probably don’t want their account stuck in limbo.

Need a Hand?

If you want to be certain that you’re meeting the standard described in this blog, or just someone to chat with to make sure that you’re on the right track please contact us.

Full Text Response

Good afternoon Ms. Scott,

Thank you for contacting the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), Canada’s independent agency responsible for the collection, analysis, assessment and disclosure of information in order to assist in the detection, prevention, and deterrence of money laundering and financing of terrorist activities in Canada and abroad.

You indicated, “some payment providers have the capacity to match the customer’s name to the name on the account (and will not process transactions if there is not a match) and return information about the type of account to which the transaction was pushed.”

In light of this, you have asked whether micro-withdrawals and/or micro-deposits would be acceptable for use as confirmation of a deposit account provided that:

(a) there was a confirmed name match; and

(b) the account type was confirmed as a deposit account.

Subparagraph 64(1)(b)(ii) of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR) states that non-face-to-face identification can be done by using a combination of identification methods as set out in Part A of Schedule 7, the confirmation of deposit account method being one. This method of ascertaining a person’s identity consists of confirming that the person has a deposit account with a financial entity, other than an account referred to in section 62 of the PCMLTFR. For the deposit account method, paragraph 67(c) of the PCMLTFR requires that the client name, the deposit account number, the financial entity name, and the date of the confirmation be recorded. Therefore, if the payment provider confirms the client name, the deposit account number, the financial entity name, and the date of the confirmation, then yes, the micro-withdrawals and/or micro-deposits is an acceptable means to confirm a deposit account with a financial entity as per Part A of Schedule 7 of the PCMLTFR, and would satisfy one of the two combination methods required.

Please note that FINTRAC does not endorse nor advertise any products, companies, or providers of consumer information.

I trust this information will be of assistance.

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