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Above And Beyond What?

It seems that every time I’m at a conference or event related to compliance, I hear people talking about going “above and beyond” the requirements. Something about this statement has always seemed wrong to me. It wasn’t until recently that I understood why: most of us aren’t getting the basics right.

FINTRAC Examination Data

 

Most Of Us Are Failing At The Basics

This is not an indictment of Compliance Officers and the tremendous effort that goes into compliance. It’s a simple statistical fact.

We crunched some numbers by industry for anti-money laundering (AML) compliance in Canada based on information obtained from the regulator through an access to information request in 2014. The rate of examinations for which there were no deficiencies (across all reporting entity types) was 17 percent. While we congratulate the savvy few that met this bar, that leaves 83 percent of reporting entities that failed to meet the basic requirements in some way.

While these results are specific to examinations conducted by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), it’s not unreasonable to assume that the results can be generalized to compliance more broadly.

Shift The Focus

Before anyone can go “above and beyond” the fundamentals should be solid. One of the most painful reviews (like an audit for compliance) that I’ve conducted was a classic case of going above and beyond while completely missing the mark on baseline compliance. The reporting entity had great technology and related risk ranking metrics. The methods that they used to understand customer behavior involved machine learning and geo-location data at each login, analyzed over time. It was a great risk management strategy, except that they hadn’t identified a single customer in accordance with the law. Not a single one…

Ironically, in working to design measures that went beyond the basic compliance requirements, they found themselves so far outside of what was allowable under the law that had an examination been conducted by a regulator at the time, they could have been facing a very hefty penalty (as was the case for Ripple Labs in the USA).

Rework

Consequently, they spent a good deal of time and money updating their systems and identifying customers. In some cases, customers were lost. The (re)identification process was frustrating for people that believed that they had already completed everything that was needful in order to transact freely. There were updates to process documents and IT systems that took place over the course of months, and a good deal of frustration at the rework involved.

A competent third party or in house expert can be useful in assisting with system and process design, provided that they are able to understand your business model, basic compliance requirements and how to achieve these in the most elegant way possible.

Keep It Simple (Seriously)

At a recent conference, I was listening to a speaker whom I consider a model for what not to do, both functionally and ethically. As he sweepingly gestured towards an overly complex chart, he stared into the blank faces of his audience and proclaimed “It’s ok if you don’t get it. That’s not the point. The point is that I should look impressive. Are you impressed?” I was not.

Which model fits your needs?

Which model fits your needs?

Remember that the people that are usually fulfilling your compliance requirements are your frontline staff. Would they be able to use the model to the left to risk rank your customers?

While it can be tempting to create complex rating systems, it’s important to understand that your compliance program should be functional. If the system that you’ve created is too complex for your staff to understand and adhere to, it will fail. Whether you’re hiring someone external or creating your program in-house, remember to keep it as simple and easy to follow as possible.

Ask, Check, Test

One of the many arguments that I’ve heard for going above and beyond is that this is helpful when dealing with regulators and banking service providers. While I agree that this can certainly be the case, it’s a moot point if the basic requirements are not met.

In my experience, both regulators and bankers are candid – when asked – about where their expectations are set. There is no real appetite on the part of either to create a set of secret standards related to going above and beyond. From a practical perspective, this means that reporting entities should be focused on understanding the basic requirements, and seeking clarification as needed.

Effectiveness reviews can also be a useful tool in this regard, provided that the reviewer or auditor is well versed in local compliance requirements. Similarly, internal testing should be geared towards baseline requirements to ensure that these are being met.

Opportunities & Innovation

Going above and beyond for its own sake (in terms of compliance) is neither required, nor particularly good business.

This is not to say that reporting entities should avoid innovation. Rather, these efforts should be focused and prioritized on finding the most cost-effective and efficient ways to meet baseline compliance requirements, and mitigating risk.

Changing compliance legislation can also provide opportunities for innovation, in particular where there are public consultations. This type of dialogue with lawmakers allows stakeholders to suggest alternatives that may mitigate risk in new and innovative ways. It provides an opportunity to showcase new technologies and processes that solve common compliance problems with greater efficiency (although they may not fit into the current regulatory paradigm).

Need A Hand?

We believe that good compliance is good business. If you have questions, please feel free to contact us.

Proposed PCMLTFR Updates

Screen Shot 2015-07-08 at 4.03.31 AM

We’ve created a marked-up version of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR) that reflects the draft amendments posted in the Canada Gazette on July 4th, 2015.

Here’s a printable and downloadable PDF file: PCMLTFR Mark-Up (July 4, 2015 Draft Amendments)

If you would like a copy of the file in Microsoft Word, please contact us.

Need A Hand?

At Outlier, we believe that it is important to participate in decisions that affect you and your business.  If you would like someone to look over your submission before you make comments to the Department of Finance, you can get in touch with us free of charge.  We will look over your submission and make suggestions, without any cost to you.  If you need a hand, please feel free to contact us.

Unpublished FINTRAC Penalties

Jonathan Krumins, Vice President, vCAMLO

Today’s guest blogger is Jonathan Krumins, Vice-President, AML Risk & Compliance, at vCAMLO Solutions Inc. vCAMLO provides anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-terrorist financing (ATF) support to Canadian credit unions. You can learn more about vCAMLO at www.vcamlo.ca.

Background

Reporting entities (REs) often ask us about penalties, in particular when they are published publicly. Since 2009, The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) has issued Administrative Monetary Penalties (AMPs) against persons and entities that were found to have violated the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, and its associated Regulations. In many cases up to 2013, FINTRAC has published details on its website about each penalty, including the name of the person or entity, the dollar amount of the AMP, as well as the cited deficiencies. The AMP area of their website has two sections – a list of all published penalties, as well as a running total of AMPs imposed since December 30, 2008, divided by sector.

As of June 26, 2013, FINTRAC changed its policy regarding public notice of AMPs, so that they would be published if one or more of the following criteria are met:

  • The person or entity has committed a very serious violation; or
  • The base penalty amount is equal to or greater than $250,000, before adjustments are made in consideration of the person or entity’s compliance history and ability to pay; or
  • Repeat significant non-compliance on the part of the person or entity.

AMPs can only be published once the appeals process is exhausted, which can take years to complete. This process can include an appeal to FINTRAC’s director, and a subsequent appeal to the Canadian Federal court.

Understanding this context is vital for RE Compliance Officers. While trend information related to published and unpublished penalties is not likely of interest to frontline staff, understanding these patterns is useful in fielding questions from Senior Management and the Board of Directors.

We have conducted an analysis of data published on the FINTRAC’s website which shows a trend of an increasing number of unpublished AMPs since 2013. These unpublished AMPs were primarily imposed on the Credit Union/Caisse Populaire and Money Service Business (MSB) sectors.

Methodology

We have made all calculations using information available as of April 20, 2015. We examined publicly available information on FINTRAC’s webpage, using the running total of AMPs by sector and the list of public AMPs. We also examined a summary of AMPs as of October 2014 obtained by Outlier through an Access to Information request. Our analysis focuses only on the sectors that have received AMPs, either published or unpublished: Credit Unions (including Caisses Populaires), MSBs, Real Estate Brokers, Securities Dealers and Casinos.

In addition, we accessed “cached” versions of FINTRAC’s website to review past versions in order to include six public AMPs that were issued between August 19, 2009 and April 26, 2010. In accordance with FINTRAC policy, these were removed from FINTRAC’s website after the five year public notice period had expired. We have included this historical data in order to provide a full view of the penalties issued. It is noteworthy that there are likely additional penalties in the process of being appealed (this information cannot be made available until the appeals process is complete).

Published AMPs vs. Unpublished AMPs

By analyzing the list of published penalties, compared to the running total of AMPs, it appears that there have been a significant number of unpublished penalties:

FINTRAC AMPs

Credit Unions

Credit Unions have received the largest number of unpublished penalties, both in terms of number and dollar amount. Credit unions have received 3 published AMPs, totalling $246,690. They have also received an additional 11 unpublished AMPs, totalling $405,855.

Trend analysis: This appears to be a significant increase in overall enforcement action by FINTRAC in the Credit Union sector. The total number of penalties against Credit Unions have increased sharply to 14, which means that Credit Unions now have the second largest number of listed AMPs (published and unpublished), behind MSBs. All penalties against Credit Unions since 2013 were unpublished. This data can also be interpreted to mean that FINTRAC’s enforcement efforts against Credit Unions have increased since 2013, however it is important to remember that AMPs are listed on FINTRAC’s website after they are finalized, which can mean a significant gap between when an AMP was issued and when it is listed, especially if there is an appeal involved.

Money Service Businesses (MSBs)

MSBs have received 22 published penalties, totalling $527,510. They also have received eight unpublished penalties, totalling $68,520. Interestingly, a $12,880 penalty that was published against an MSB on July 11, 2013 no longer appears on FINTRAC’s website.

Trend analysis: MSBs continue to be the leading sector in terms of receiving AMPs, although similar to the other sectors examined, the majority of AMPs that were against MSBs from late 2013 through to 2015 were unpublished.

Real Estate Brokers

Real Estate Brokers have received three published penalties totalling $40,520 compared to three unpublished penalties totalling $25,960.

Trend Analysis: Real Estate Brokers have received relatively few published and unpublished penalties in comparison to the Credit Union and MSB sectors. The number of unpublished penalties (compared to the number of published penalties) is consistent with trends across all sectors.

Securities Dealers

Securities Dealers have received four published penalties totalling $565,180 compared to one unpublished penalty of $21,480.

Trend Analysis: Securities Dealers have received relatively few published and unpublished penalties in comparison to the Credit Union and MSB sectors.

Casinos

Casinos have never received a published AMP, however FINTRAC’s website shows an unpublished AMP of $56,700 issued against a casino. This may be surprising to anyone that has read about BC Lottery Corporation, however, AMPs are not part of these records until the appeals process has been exhausted (and there have been successful appeals).

Trend analysis: It is difficult to establish a trend based on a single data point, however this unpublished AMP shows that the Casino sector is no longer unaffected by FINTRAC penalties.

What Does This All Mean?

Screen Shot 2015-05-06 at 11.58.01 AM

Note: The dates on the above graph represent when FINTRAC’s website was analyzed to calculate the total number of penalties, with the exception of October 2014, which is the “as of” date of an AMP listing received in a Freedom of Information request. Data for unpublished AMPs is only available since 2013.

As of June 2013, FINTRAC began to apply the updated standard for publicly listing AMPs. Since this change, unpublished penalties comprise approximately 42% of all issued AMPs by amount and 43% by number. While this is excellent news for REs that are concerned with the negative media and other reputational risk related to published penalties, it will make it more difficult to assess the reasons that REs are receiving penalties. The specific violations that led to a penalty are only made public by FINTRAC when the AMP is published. In order to ensure that our Credit Union clients are well-informed about industry trends related to penalties, vCAMLO will be requesting additional information and performing trend analysis. Stay tuned!

Your Best Defence

To avoid AMPs, it is essential to constantly test for weaknesses in your compliance regime. Conduct rigorous effectiveness testing (this is required at least every two years), and consider more frequent testing. Finally, ensure that immediate steps are taken to remediate deficiencies received in FINTRAC exams. Deficiencies that re-appear in follow-up exams are taken seriously by FINTRAC, and can lead to penalties, published or not.

Need a Hand?

vCAMLO: If you are a credit union or MSB, and have any questions related to financial compliance, or if you are interested in AML Support Services, please contact us for a complimentary 30 minute compliance discussion.

Outlier: If you need assistance reviewing your technology solution or FINTRAC reporting to be certain that you’re meeting the standard described in this blog, or just someone to chat with to make sure that you’re on the right track, please contact us.

 

 

 

Suspicious Transaction Reporting in 2015

Preparing for a FINTRAC examination

At the Canadian Institute’s 14th Annual AML Forum, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) reviewed its expectations for suspicious transaction reporting. FINTRAC emphasized that suspicious transaction reports (STRs) are vital to the agency’s mandate as Canada’s financial intelligence unit (FIU) and ongoing collaboration with law enforcement agencies. While reporting entities (REs) in Canada have been required to report transactions for quite a few years, we’ve had many questions from REs about what FINTRAC expects and looks for in examinations. FINTRAC’s most recent guidance is useful in tuning your technology, enhancing your processes, and asking the right questions at industry association meetings.

What is FINTRAC Looking for in STRs?

When FINTRAC conducts compliance examinations, they will be applying three tests to STR data, including:

  1. Entity Practitioner: FINTRAC will look for transactions that are similar to those involved in STRs that you have reported. If there are similar transactions or transaction patterns that have not been reported to FINTRAC, there should be an explanation for the difference. Where possible, this explanation should be documented.
  2. Sector Practitioner: FINTRAC will compare the number and type of STRs submitted by similar entities. The size and type of business are taken into consideration.
  3. Reasonable Practitioner: FINTRAC will analyze a sample of reported STRs and unreported transactions against relevant guidance. In this case, relevant guidance means the suspicious transaction indicators from FINTRAC’s Guideline 2 that are applicable to your business.

These are terms that we’re likely to hear more about over the coming months, and there are compliance program adjustments (most of them relatively simple) that can be made to ensure that you’re meeting this standard.

Tune Your Technology

Amber looking at laptop FINTRAC screen

Most REs use software solutions to detect potentially suspicious transactions. Almost all transaction monitoring software uses some type of rules-based system to determine when alerts should be generated. These rules should, at minimum, reflect the indicators that are applicable to your business. Not all of the indicators from FINTRAC’s Guideline 2 will be applicable to your business. Where possible, you should document the decisions that you make about your transaction monitoring rules, including the rationale for those decisions.

The most sophisticated software platforms have machine learning functions. These can take the decisions that have been made about previous alerts and use this information to refine how the program works. For example, if a particular pattern of transactions was deemed to be suspicious, the program may look for similar patterns.

If you’re not using software that does this on its own, don’t panic. You can review the STRs that you’ve submitted to FINTRAC to determine whether your transaction monitoring rules are tuned to reflect the types of money laundering and terrorist financing threats that you’ve previously encountered. This should be done on a regular basis (for example, as part of your Risk Assessment updates). If you have an STR that is related to a pattern that you don’t have a rule to cover, you may want to do this sooner, rather than waiting for the next scheduled update.

Train Your Staff

Training

Over the years, I’ve heard many Compliance Officers express frustration about not knowing whether or not STR data has been useful to FINTRAC or law enforcement. To close this gap, I’ve looked for articles and speakers from FINTRAC and law enforcement that could provide meaningful information about the type of information that is most useful. The same principle applies to your staff.

You can use existing cases (you’ll want to remove any personal information for training purposes) to demonstrate the type of transactions that you want your staff to escalate to compliance for review. Existing cases from the media, and end to end cases provided by training companies like TAMLO, are also excellent resources. Keeping your annual training fresh is a challenge, and using your STRs as cases is one way to do that, while also meeting FINTRAC’s expectations.

Refine Your Audits & Effectiveness Reviews

AML Compliance Effectiveness Review

Are your auditors and/or reviewers using the same tests that FINTRAC is using to assess your compliance? If you’re not certain, ask.

If you perform self-assessment testing, you may want to include these tests as well.

As of 2015, all AML Compliance Effectiveness Reviews performed by Outlier will use these three key tests to assess STR data.

Ask Your Industry & Working Groups for More

Hanshake

Most REs have excellent industry associations and working groups such as the Canadian Banker’s Association (CBA), Canadian MSB Association (CMSBA) or the Canadian Jewellers Association (CJA). These groups are excellent resources and can help you understand STR trends across your industry. If you’re not a member, you may still be able to attend regular conferences or events.

Need A Hand?

We would love to hear from you. If there are topics that you would like to know more about, or if you need assistance with your compliance program, please contact us.

FINTRAC Examination Results for MSBs

The Canadian Money Services Business Association (CMSBA) recently held their Spring Training events in Montreal, Vancouver and Toronto.  The list of speakers included MSB industry professionals, as well as representatives from regulators including the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC).  For a full synopsis of the Montreal and Toronto events, click here.  FINTRAC presented excellent statistical data about how MSBs have fared in examinations conducted between April 2011 and July 2014.  So how are MSBs faring?  Very well overall. 

ZDE FINTRAC 2008-2013

Data obtained through a freedom of information request indicates that almost 25% of MSBs examined between 2008 and 2013 have not had any deficiencies.

How Does FINTRAC Decide Who Is Examined?

FINTRAC considers several factors when deciding which reporting entities (REs) will be examined.

  • Concurrent Examinations: examinations conducted in tandem with the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI). This is applicable to federally regulated financial entities (FRFEs) like banks.
  • Market Share: The largest reporting entities in Canada (because the larger an organization is, the more critical the risk of non-compliance will be);
  • Cyclical: Coverage of a whole industry (this seemed to apply most to Casinos).
  • Follow-Up: Subsequent examinations based, with an emphasis on the resolution of deficiencies found in previous examination(s) to ensure remediation. FINTRAC noted that although it is no longer a requirement to submit a formal action plan to FINTRAC, it is a best practice for REs to document (and update) an action plan internally.
  • Risk: FINTRAC’s evaluation of the RE’s risk, based on a broad selection criteria, such as money laundering and terrorist financing vulnerabilities, the likelihood of non-compliance and industry trends.
  • Theme-Based: Related to specific intelligence about a RE or type of business that indicates there may be an elevated risk of non-compliance, money laundering vulnerability or terrorist financing vulnerability.

Methodology & Analysis

FINTRAC’s statistical analysis of MSB adherence to the requirements laid out in the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA) and its regulations is broken down by percentage, the results of the exams conducted that were fully compliant, partially compliant and non-compliant.  These are colour coded:

  • Green: fully compliant (no deficiencies were observed),
  • Yellow: partially compliant (there was something in place, but the MSB missed something), and
  • Red: non-compliant (in most cases, there was nothing in place or a reporting timeframe was missed).

Overall examination results have been positive.

Overview

It’s noteworthy that if FINTRAC has, as of 2014, found something during an examination that is considered ‘immaterial’, it’s not cited.  For example, in a large sample, if there are two client addresses that appear to be PO boxes, but all other client addresses were complete and in acceptable formats, there may not be a citation.  In these cases, FINTRAC may inform the RE verbally, but it will not be part of the formal ‘findings’ letter.

Compliance Officer

MSBs are required to have a Compliance Officer (a person that is responsible for overseeing the AML & ATF compliance program).  The appointment of the Compliance Officer must be documented in writing.  FINTRAC staff chided that this is likely the easiest area to achieve a fully compliant result in examinations.  MSB examination results certainly reflected this.

CO Chart

From a total of 612 MSB examinations considered, 608 MSBs were fully compliant.

Only four MSBs were deemed to be non-compliant.  It was noted that these were generally new market entrants that did not appear to understand Canadian AML & ATF compliance requirements.

Policies and Procedures

MSBs are required to have policies and procedures.  Policies describe the MSB’s regulatory obligations, while procedures describe what the MSB is doing to meet those requirements.  These must be documented, in writing, and the procedures must cover both staff and agents (if the MSB has agents).

PP Chart

From a total of 765 MSB examinations considered, 477 MSBs were fully compliant.

In 230 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  Common errors included:

  • The omission of the 24-hour rule (specific descriptions of how the MSB determined whether or not reportable transactions had occurred over a 24 hour period),
  • Third party determinations (specific descriptions of when an MSB must determine if there is a third party involved, as well as what information needs to be collected and recorded), and
  • Politically exposed foreign person (PEFP) determinations (specific descriptions of when an MSB must determine if their client is a PEFP, and if so, what information needs to be collected/recorded. There is also a requirement that senior management signoff on the account within 30 days of the determination).

A total of 55 MSBs did not have any documented policies or procedures. In some cases, FINTRAC noted that there appeared to be processes in place, but that these were not documented in writing.

Training

MSBs are required to have an ongoing training program. The training program must be documented (who, what, where, when and how) and delivered to all staff and agents on an annual basis, at minimum.

Training Chart

From a total of 487 MSB examinations considered, 346 were fully compliant.

In 63 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  Common errors included:

  • Interviews conducted with staff during an examination that evidenced a misunderstanding of the requirements (during an exam, FINTRAC will interview random staff members related to regulatory requirements to ensure training effectiveness)

In 78 examinations, MSBs did not have any training in place, or if they did, it was not documented.

Among the training options available to MSBs, we’re most excited about a relatively new offering from TAMLO that includes fast paced and visually stunning video content, as well as testing and tracking tools for Compliance Officers.

AML Compliance Effectiveness Review

MSBs are required to complete an AML Compliance Effectiveness Review once every two years.  The review must cover all policy and procedure documentation, as well as operational testing to ensure procedures are being properly followed.

2YR Chart

From a total of 722 MSB examinations considered, 412 were fully compliant.

In 101 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  Where MSBs missed the mark was typically because they did not respect the two year cycle.  Other common errors included:

  • Only reviewing the policy documents with no operational testing of whether they are being followed (the policy document tells staff and agents what to do. Procedures tell them how to do it.  MSBs must be sure they are testing whether staff and agents are adhering to the procedures).

In 209 examinations, MSBs had not conducted an effectiveness review or could not provide evidence of one taking place.

Risk Assessment

MSBs are required to assess the risk that their business could be used for money laundering or terrorist financing.  The risk assessment must include four key components:

  • Products, services and delivery channels;
  • Geography;
  • Customers; and
  • Any other relevant factors.

Risk must be assessed and scored, and mitigated by appropriate controls.

RA Chart

From a total of 720 MSB examinations considered, 432 were fully compliant.

In 158 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  The main issue was failing to include one of the four required elements. In some cases, a risk assessment was in place, but the documentation was not sufficient in assessing the MSB’s risk and controls.

In 129 examinations, MSBs had no evidence of a risk assessment.

FINTRAC noted that additional industry-specific risk assessment guidance is expected to be published later this year.

MSB Registration

MSBs are required to register with FINTRAC, as well as update their information within 30 days if there are any changes to business activities, banking or agent information.

MSB Reg Chart

From a total of 591 MSB examinations considered, 230 were fully compliant.

In this category, no partially compliant ratings were provided (the MSB registration was either complete, accurate and up to date, or it was deemed to be non-compliant).

In 361 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be non-compliant.  Most issues were due to a failure to update information when something within the business had changed or a failure to list all business activities. For example, the MSB registration may indicate that an MSB only performed foreign exchange in a case where remittance services were also provided.

Client Identification

MSBs are required to identify their clients in certain situations.  There are prescribed methods for completing this both in person and non-face-to-face (NF2F), and the identification document (ID) information must be recorded.

Client ID Chart

From a total of 796 MSB examinations considered, 621 were fully compliant.

In 64 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  Common errors included:

  • Unacceptable ID (such as health card in Ontario);
  • Accepting ID that was expired at the time of the transaction (identification documents must be valid, or not expired, at the time they are reviewed);
  • Failing to record the prescribed details of the ID used (when reviewing a client’s ID, MSBs must keep a record of certain prescribed information); and
  • In Non-Face-To-Face Identification situations, only using one method, or using an unacceptable combination of methods (when identifying a customer who is not physically present, there are prescribed methods of how this is to be accomplished).

In 111 examinations, MSBs were non-compliant with client identification requirements.

Record Keeping

MSBs are required to keep certain records related to transactions and client identification.  These records must be stored in a manner that they can be accessed in the event they are requested, and must be maintained for at least five years.

RK Chart

From a total of 811 MSB examinations considered, 470 were fully compliant.

In 300 examinations MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  In these cases, record keeping was taking place but elements of the record keeping requirements were being overlooked.  Common issues included:

  • Missing telephone numbers;
  • Vague occupation information (for example “manager” or “worker”);
  • PO boxes recorded as customer addresses;
  • Missing postal codes;
  • Third party determinations that were incomplete; and
  • Payment methods for incoming and outgoing payments.

In 41 examinations, MSBs were non-compliant with record keeping requirements.

Third Party Determinations

MSBs are required to make a third party determination in certain prescribed circumstances, as well as collect and record certain information (name, address, date of birth, occupation and relationship to your client) about the third party.

TPD Chart

The total number of MSBs included in the review was not provided, with the statement: “there was not enough information available to conduct reasonable analysis”.  However, the total number of non-compliant MSBs was 6, indicating that approximately 600 MSB examinations were considered in this sample.

FINTRAC Reporting

When FINTRAC assesses reporting obligations, it uses the internal acronym “QTV”, which stands for quality, timing and volume.  Quality refers to the information in the report, specifically, if the report has all the required information.  Timing simply means, was the report filed within the designated timeframe.  Volume is slightly more complicated, but mainly refers to the amount of reports you have filed compared to your previous submissions.  It was noted that typically, where MSBs were deemed partially compliant, it was due to the quality.  Where non-compliance was related to the timing.

Electronic Fund Transfers Reports

MSBs are required to submit electronic funds transfer (EFT) reports to FINTRAC within 5 business days from the date the transaction took place.  An EFT includes the international transfer of CAD 10,000 or more, either in a single transaction, or multiple transactions within a 24-hour period.

EFT Chart

From a total of 434 MSB examinations considered, 165 were fully compliant.

In 87 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant. MSBs were typically failing to include all required information, such as:

  • Phone number;
  • Date of birth; or
  • Postal code.

It is noteworthy that while not all fields are marked as required in F2R, all fields must be filled in if the MSB has recorded the information.

In 182 examinations, MSBs were deemed non-compliant, with most not reporting the EFTs within the specified time frame, and a small portion missing EFT reports.

Large Cash Transaction Reports

MSBs are required to submit large cash transaction (LCT) reports to FINTRAC within 15 calendar days from the date of the transaction, if the transaction was CAD 10,000 or more in cash, either in a single transaction, or multiple transactions within a 24-hour period.

LCTR Chart

From a total of 428 MSB examinations considered, 232 were fully compliant.

In 104 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  MSBs were typically failing to include all required information, such as:

  • Occupation;
  • Date of birth;
  • Postal code; or
  • Type of ID used to identify the client.

In 92 examinations, MSBs were non-compliant, with most not reporting the LCTs within the specified time frame, and a small portion missing LCT reports.

Suspicious Transaction Reports

MSBs are required to submit suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and attempted suspicious transaction reports (ASTRs) to FINTRAC within 30 calendar days from the date the transaction is deemed suspicious by the Compliance Officer.

STR Chart

From a total of 285 MSB examinations considered, 262 were fully compliant.

In 14 examinations, MSBs were deemed to be partially compliant.  In these cases, MSBs were typically failing to include all required information.

In 9 examinations, MSBs were non-compliant.  Failing to file STRs carries relatively sever penalties, as the Canadian intelligence community relies on this type of reporting to build cases.  Where items are escalated as being potentially suspicious (either by staff or a transaction monitoring system), MSBs should always document the reason that these items are deemed not to be suspicious if no STR or ASTR reporting is completed.

Need a Hand?

If you are an MSB that needs compliance assistance (or a bank that wants assistance in setting up and maintaining a compliance regime that effectively manages MSB related risk), please contact us.

 

 

 

Who Wins The De-Risking Shell Game?

BankRisk_2The volume of evidence, both empirical and anecdotal, grows every day. The story on the surface is simple enough: banks are making the decision to “de-risk” (a polite way to say close the account of) certain types of businesses including money service businesses (MSBs) and digital currency businesses that are considered “too risky” by traditional financial services providers. The unintended consequences have included strained remittance corridors and frustration for businesses struggling to get by without reliable banking services. While these consequences are well documented, there are other unintended consequences of the de-risking phenomenon that have been less widely discussed. These include a growing lack of transparency between some industries and their banking service providers and directly threatens our ability to effectively manage money laundering and terrorist financing risk at both the financial institution and national levels.

It’s a shell game of “hide the risk” – and we’re all losing.

Businesses Are Losing

By now, if you haven’t heard about businesses struggling to survive without access to banking facilities, you would have had to ignore financial media for the past two years. The global effects of de-risking have attracted the attention of the G-20, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the World Bank, and many more. While it’s clear that there are issues in terms of access to banking, let’s be honest with one another: while some businesses will close up shop, many others will take a different track.

Whether it’s using alternative financial service providers, payment processors, personal bank accounts or merely opening accounts at other financial institutions without revealing the true nature of the underlying activity, businesses will find a way to carry on. I’ve spoken personally to businesses that have taken these approaches, and it has never been their first or most ideal choice. These aren’t criminals carrying on some nefarious business! They are entrepreneurs who would rather be able to provide their real business plan to their banks and explain their activity honestly, but they do not believe that this option is open to them.

Banks Are Losing

Consequently, a bank with a policy that prohibits these types of businesses from holding accounts will deal with businesses that have gone to great lengths to conceal the true nature of their activity. The banks are unaware of the true nature of the activity passing through their accounts, and therefore ill equipped to manage the risk related to these activities. The strain on banking resources must be phenomenal, as banks must constantly devise new ways to interpret patterns of customer activity to detect undeclared MSB or digital currency activity. While it isn’t easy to quantify these costs, I can only surmise that the cost of this detective work must be high, despite being ineffective.

To further muddy the waters, businesses who fail to provide transparent information to their banks for fear of de-risking may also conduct completely legal activities in a way that starts to look like criminal activity. For example, if you believe that your business banking relationship is not reliable, you may open many accounts (in some combination of personal and business names) and conduct fractions of your banking through each, transferring funds from one account to another as needed to meet your obligations. On the surface, it can seem much like “layering” or “structuring” activity (techniques used by money launderers to make funds more difficult to trace). This further adds to the banks’ burden by creating more activity that must be monitored and investigated.

Entire Nations Are Losing

It has been widely publicized that in some cases like Somalia, entire nations that are dependent on remittance payments from friends and family living and working abroad are experiencing increased difficulty. Reliable and cost-effective remittance payment providers are a shrinking pool. This seems absurd in a time when technology can facilitate a payment in seconds.

National Security Is Losing

It’s not just far-flung places dependent on remittance payments that are losing. Here at home, we have a national security system that is dependent on our financial intelligence units (FIUs) having access to reliable data. The reliability of that data is undermined at every level by the de-risking shell game:

  • Businesses do not declare the true nature of their activity – and there are no incentives for them to do so;
  • Banks do not understand the nature of their customers’ activities, making it difficult detect potentially criminal activity; and
  • There is likely to be an increase in “false positives”, where activity conducted by businesses that do not believe that they can reveal the true nature of their activity to their banks instead conduct business in a manner that resembles criminal money laundering techniques.

Taken together, this results in the likelihood that key information is not being reported to FIUs correctly. Consequently, it becomes more difficult for law enforcement and other national securities to rely on this data to perform their roles effectively.

Who Is Winning?

There are two potential winners in this game and much like the shell games that you see duping tourists on the streets of large cities, neither is without malevolent intent.

The first are unregistered/unlicensed MSB businesses. These are businesses that have ignored regulatory requirements and carried on business without any FIU reporting. In some cases, these businesses will even minimize their interaction with the local financial system by using foreign bank accounts (and point of sale terminals) to collect customer funds. While the risk of penalty is high, the reward for these businesses (in particular where they are able to complete transactions that pose a challenge for their compliant counterparts) can also be high.

The second is criminal organizations. When legitimate businesses are performing transactions that look like money laundering, detecting true criminal activity becomes exponentially more difficult. I can only assume that the criminals are laughing all the way to the bank.

Shutting Down The Shell Game

De-risking is a complex problem with complex outcomes, but the solution need not be complicated. It does, however, involve the cooperation of all levels of the financial services community: regulators, banking service providers and businesses.

The costs and benefits of de-risking need to be reassessed. Where banking service providers are capable of accepting and managing accounts for businesses considered to be “higher risk”, they should do so, with their regulator’s blessing. Rather than perpetuating the shell game, regulators should encourage banking service providers to manage risk (and provide solid guidance with reference to how this should be done). Finally, there should be open communication between banking service providers, regulators and business banking customers. The lines of communication closed by de-risking must be opened, allowing banks to have honest conversations that will provide real insight into their customers’ business and lead to effective long-term risk management.

Micro Deposits & Micro Withdrawals

The Big DisclaimerAmber looking at laptop blank screen

We’re not lawyers and nothing that we write should be considered a legal opinion. Whether or not a solution will be acceptable to your regulators will always depend on your implementation and documentation – please contact us if you need help with either.

Background

There are a limited number of ways for Canadian reporting entities to identify individuals without meeting face to face. Previously, we have sought opinions from the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) on whether or not micro deposits and micro withdrawals could be used to confirm a customer’s identity. Until recently, the answer had been no. We reached out to FINTRAC again on the issue after learning that technology had evolved in a way that could meet the requirements. We’re pleased to share with you that FINTRAC is of the opinion that – given the right technology conditions – micro deposits and micro withdrawals can indeed be used to confirm a customer’s identity.

Confirmation Of A Deposit Account

The methods that can be used to confirm a customer’s identity are listed in Schedule 7 of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR). (Since this post was written, Schedule 7 has been repealed and replaced by FINTRAC’s Methods to Identify Individuals). The “Confirmation of a Deposit Account Method” involves confirming that the person has a deposit account (this means a chequing or savings type of account) with a Canadian financial entity (this means a bank, credit union or caisse populaire). To use this method, reporting entities must keep a record of the name of the financial entity where the account is held, the account number and the date of the confirmation.

The key elements of this method involve determining that the account belongs to the person that you are trying to identify and determining that the account is indeed a chequing or savings type of account.

Micro Deposits and Micro Withdrawals

Previously, micro deposits and micro withdrawals were viewed as failing on both of these key elements. Confirming the amount of a micro transaction proved that a person had access to the account, but not that they owned the account. It was also viewed as impossible to determine the type of account (for instance the account may have been a line of credit that had a similar account number structure).

Fortunately, technology has advanced and some payment processors are able to conduct name matching (in some cases, payments are even stopped if there isn’t a match) as well as the type of account. Not all payment processors may have the capabilities, but if you’re looking for a way to automate some of your non face-to-face customer identification, this could be an option.

Implementation Checklist

We’ve broken down the implementation into seven key questions. If you’re able to answer yes in each case, you’re likely to be ready to implement micro deposits or micro withdrawals as an identification method.

  1. Does my payment processor conduct name matching (our client’s name against the account being debited or credited) and what confirmation do we receive of a match?
  2. Is our system set up to keep a record that demonstrates that the name was matched?
  3. Does my payment processor have access to the account type when an account is being debited or credited and can they pass that information to us and/or confirm for us that the account is a deposit account?
  4. Is our system set up to keep a record of the type of account or confirmation that the account is a deposit account?
  5. Is our system set up to keep a record of the name of the financial entity where the account is held?
  6. Is our system set up to keep a record of the account number?
  7. Is our system set up to keep a record of the date of the confirmation?

In addition to this list, you should also give some thought to what happens when identification fails (for example if the name doesn’t match or the account isn’t the right type). You’ll need to consider an alternative way to identify your client, and you probably don’t want their account stuck in limbo.

Need a Hand?

If you want to be certain that you’re meeting the standard described in this blog, or just someone to chat with to make sure that you’re on the right track please contact us.

Full Text Response

Good afternoon Ms. Scott,

Thank you for contacting the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), Canada’s independent agency responsible for the collection, analysis, assessment and disclosure of information in order to assist in the detection, prevention, and deterrence of money laundering and financing of terrorist activities in Canada and abroad.

You indicated, “some payment providers have the capacity to match the customer’s name to the name on the account (and will not process transactions if there is not a match) and return information about the type of account to which the transaction was pushed.”

In light of this, you have asked whether micro-withdrawals and/or micro-deposits would be acceptable for use as confirmation of a deposit account provided that:

(a) there was a confirmed name match; and

(b) the account type was confirmed as a deposit account.

Subparagraph 64(1)(b)(ii) of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR) states that non-face-to-face identification can be done by using a combination of identification methods as set out in Part A of Schedule 7, the confirmation of deposit account method being one. This method of ascertaining a person’s identity consists of confirming that the person has a deposit account with a financial entity, other than an account referred to in section 62 of the PCMLTFR. For the deposit account method, paragraph 67(c) of the PCMLTFR requires that the client name, the deposit account number, the financial entity name, and the date of the confirmation be recorded. Therefore, if the payment provider confirms the client name, the deposit account number, the financial entity name, and the date of the confirmation, then yes, the micro-withdrawals and/or micro-deposits is an acceptable means to confirm a deposit account with a financial entity as per Part A of Schedule 7 of the PCMLTFR, and would satisfy one of the two combination methods required.

Please note that FINTRAC does not endorse nor advertise any products, companies, or providers of consumer information.

I trust this information will be of assistance.

Why We Believe In The Right To Business Banking

I remember my first thoughts on money services businesses (MSBs) very distinctly.   Years ago, when I moved from being a banker to being a consultant, I thought of MSBs as being predatory and fly by night. I didn’t know much about MSBs, and I was hesitant to work with them as clients. Fortunately, a colleague determined to change my point of view, brought me to a meeting with one of her clients, a remittance company that served a particular ethnic community.

My colleague asked her client to walk me through the business model, and as the discussion progressed, I quickly understood that the MSB was offering many services that the banks were not – some of them free of charge. Not only was the MSB providing services in their customers’ native language, the fees were low and there were a slew of additional services like lawyer and employment agency referrals (all services in the customers’ native language). The office space was a bright and clean retail location and all of the staff seemed genuinely excited to be there. It was clear that I had misjudged MSBs (or at the very least, this MSB).

Over the years I’ve worked with many MSB clients and have come to understand that this was not a unique situation. In Canada we have many great MSBs that are providing services in nimble and efficient ways that truly meet the needs of their communities. My team and I have been able to help MSBs build compliance programs, risk assessments, training and complete effectiveness reviews, but the most common request that we’ve received is something that we’re simply not able to do: open a bank account.

From startups to MSB businesses that have been in existence for many years, opening a bank account (and keeping it open) is more difficult than staying in compliance with the law, or running a profitable business. Recently, we’ve also been approached by companies that deal in digital currencies like bitcoin with the same type of request. While we can certainly provide advice on how to approach the problem (see our blog on keeping your bank happy), we aren’t a bank and don’t have the power to compel banks to open accounts for our customers, or to keep them open. The lack of available banking facilities is deeply troubling to me, both as a Canadian entrepreneur and as a compliance expert.

Stifling Innovation

Recently, the Canadian Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce held sessions related to digital currency. One of the messages that was clear in all sessions was the disconnect between the traditional financial system (represented primarily by banks) and the emerging digital currency markets. While digital currency has come a long way, companies have difficulty operating using digital currency alone. Unfortunately, many of these companies are currently unbanked (including companies that have a history of profitability and companies that accept payment in digital currency – but do not sell digital currency to the public). While Canada is, in many ways, recognized as a hotbed of digital currency innovation, banking challenges are daunting to companies considering a Canadian presence.

While some laud the regulation of digital currencies expected to come into play following the Royal Assent of Bill C-31 earlier this year, it is noteworthy that this is unlikely to solve the existing banking issues faced by these companies. ‘Dealers in digital currency’ (a term that has yet to be fully defined) will be regulated as MSBs, and MSBs face very similar banking challenges despite being regulated entities. New MSB startups (including MSBs that aren’t dealing in digital currency) have great difficulty in obtaining and maintaining basic banking facilities.

The Risk of ‘De-Risking’

As an entrepreneur, it troubles me that companies that have followed all of the rules are denied the opportunity to innovate because they don’t have access to banking services. As a compliance professional, I’m equally troubled by the workarounds that I’ve seen in action. These have ranged from misrepresenting the nature of a company’s business to incorporating multiple companies that settle transactions between one another (or access banking services on one another’s behalf) to the use of personal bank accounts to operate businesses. In essence, accessing banking in a way that banking service providers don’t understand because providing accurate information is seen as putting the business at risk.

Banks and other banking service providers are heavily regulated, and their requirements include knowing their customers and understanding their customers’ transactions. MSBs and digital currency businesses are generally (effectively always) seen as being higher risk and requiring enhanced due diligence (EDD). There are few motivations for banking service providers to take on higher risk customers, in particular if the banking service provider cannot be certain that the account will be profitable. To this end, some banks have openly stated that they will not deal with MSBs or digital currency companies at all. Others charge screening fees (which can range up to several thousand dollars) required as part of the account application process, with no guarantee of an account. Most banks that offer accounts to these types of businesses charge fees (in addition to regular banking fees) in order to maintain accounts.

Even when an MSB or digital currency company opens a bank account, there is the possibility that the banking service provider will close the account (referred to in the banking community as “de-marketing” or “de-risking”) with very little notice. Consequently, there is very little incentive for MSBs or digital currency companies to be transparent with their banking service providers. These businesses need bank accounts in order to thrive, and they don’t perceive themselves as being able to access banking services by being open and transparent. This creates a situation wherein many companies operate “under the radar,” accessing banking services without providing a fulsome understanding of their business or transactions.

In these situations, banking service providers are not meeting their regulatory obligations as they don’t truly know their customer, nor understand their transactions. Many financial institutions have mechanisms in place to detect undeclared MSB activity and /or digital currency related activity. While it’s not possible to say with certainty how effective these controls are, my experience would suggest that the number of financial institutions that are dealing with MSBs and digital currency businesses is close to 100% (regardless of the policies or controls in place). In other words, de-risking MSBs today is about as effective as the prohibition of alcohol in the USA in the 1920s

Not Just A Canadian Issue

Businesses across the globe are facing similar issues, and international groups such as the World Bank have become more vocal in proposing solutions.  In their 2013 Special-Purpose Note titled “Barriers to Access to Payment Systems in Sending Countries and Proposed Solutions,” the World Bank’s  Global Remittances Working Group (GRWG) suggest five solutions, including the creation of banks focussed on serving money transfer businesses.  The issue was raised again during Global Payments Week in New York, where it was noted that it has been brought to the attention of the G20 Ministers of Finance.  While the issue is not uniquely Canadian, we believe that Canada could become a world leader in implementing a solution.

Solving The Problem

We believe that the solution to mitigating the risk related to MSB and digital currency transactions is not de-risking. This strategy only penalizes honest companies and creates an environment of mistrust. We believe that all Canadian businesses should have a right to basic banking services, in the same way that individuals are entitled to these services. In order for this to be true, businesses would need to be included in the rules set out in the Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations under the Bank Act, or similar legislation.

The risk posed by MSBs and digital currency businesses should be assessed and managed. This can only occur where these companies understand that revealing the nature of their business will not lead to “de-risking,” provided that the business is operating within the parameters set out by Canadian law (including the requirement for MSBs to be registered with FINTRAC in Canada and licensed by the AMF in Quebec). While the cost of managing related risks and performing enhanced due diligence exist, the fees related to MSB and digital currency accounts should not be so unreasonably high as to prevent access for smaller companies.

We’re Not Lobbyists, But…

Canada’s 2014 Economic Action Plan mentions “universal banking.” The website reads: “Universal access to basic banking is a cornerstone of Canada’s financial sector in which Canadians can take pride.” We’re working with industry groups to spread the message. We believe that universal banking should apply not only to individuals, but to the Canadian organizations that are innovating and helping to make Canada great.

What You Can Do

If you believe in the right to business banking, as we do, we encourage you to contact your Member of Parliament to share your thoughts.

If you own a business in Canada, you can also contact the Canadian Federation of Independent Businesses (CFIB) to request action on this initiative.  CFIB has been a powerful lobbying force for Canadian businesses in the past, and we have discussed these issues with them.  Action is most likely when it is clearly supported by their membership.

MSBs and those that work with MSBs may also consider contacting the Canadian MSB Association (CMSBA) to learn about their current initiatives.  The CMSBA represents the interests of Canadian MSBs, in addition to providing training and conferences (the next of which takes place November 18th in Toronto).

Contact Us

You can contact Outlier at any time using our online form or contact the author directly by emailing amber@outliercanada.com.

EFT Reporting Clarification – Field Limitations

Guest Blog

Our guest blogger this week is Jonathan Krumins, Vice-President, AML Risk & Compliance, at vCAMLO Solutions Inc. vCAMLO provides anti money laundering (AML) and anti-terrorist financing (ATF) support to Canadian credit unions. You can learn more about vCAMLO at www.vcamlo.ca.

Background

Over the past year, we have a noticed a change in how Electronic Fund Transfer Reports (EFTRs) are interpreted by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC).  For entities that are required to report EFTs, any amount valued at CAD 10,000 or more that is sent out of Canada or received from outside of Canada on behalf of a customer is reportable to FINTRAC within 5 business days. During recent exams, FINTRAC has been paying much closer attention to the details of each report, reviewing each field for missing or invalid information. Due to restrictions in how much information can be included in a report, an EFTR can be considered incomplete by FINTRAC, even if all information has been entered by the reporting entity.

Reports that are filed to FINTRAC electronically must meet FINTRAC’s batch reporting specifications, which includes character limits for each field in the report. For example, fields such as “Individual’s Occupation” or “Street Address” are limited to 30 characters. This presents two risks for reporting entities:

  • Descriptions that are longer than the field character limits, and
  • Limitations of third party software.

We have sought additional clarification about these scenarios, and how they may affect your FINTRAC reporting.

Information Longer than the Field Character Limit

Certain information, such as a foreign bank’s street address, can easily be longer than the 30 character limit. We recommend shortening the address as much as possible by using abbreviations, and by trying to ensure that only the bank’s civic address is included in the report.

For example:

If the complete address is: The Example Bank Building, 123 George Washington Street, P.O. Box 456 (69 characters with spaces), the address must be shortened to meet the field limits.

One option for shortening the address is: 123 George Washington St.

Limitations in Third Party Reporting Software

Some third party FINTRAC reporting software does not enforce a field cut off (and the end user may not be notified that some information was cut off). This can result in information that appears to be present in a report, but is actually cut off as it is sent to FINTRAC.

Using the same example, if only the first 30 characters are sent to FINTRAC, the address in the report would read: The Example Bank Building, 123.

Some third party reporting software provides a report “Preview” function, which can show you how the report will actually appear to FINTRAC. If this option is available, be sure to review the “Previewed” report to ensure that all necessary information is contained in the report, and that nothing is cut off.

If your third party reporting software has this limitation, we would recommend contacting the software provider to request that field limits be put in place to match FINTRAC’s reporting specifications.

Need a Hand?

vCAMLO: If you are a credit union or MSB, and have any questions related to EFTR, LCTR or STR reporting, or if you are interested in AML Support Services, please contact us for a complimentary 30 minute compliance discussion.

Outlier: If you need assistance reviewing your technology solution or FINTRAC reporting to be certain that you’re meeting the standard described in this blog, or just someone to chat with to make sure that you’re on the right track please contact us.

Full Text Response

Good afternoon Mr. Krumins,

Thank you for your follow-up inquiry.

As previously stated, the reporting entity is required to include the relevant information to identify the destination or sending institution. It is for the reporting entity to determine the relevant information as this is a question of fact.

For an international or foreign address, there is no specific formula since every country has its own conventions. If no numerical address exists, the reporting entity should take reasonable measures to include the relevant information to help identify the destination or sending institution. When the reporting entity is reporting non-SWIFT Electronic Funds Transfers, and the institution’s information exceeds the character capacity in the given address field, then the reporting entity should consider ways to abbreviate names or words, without deteriorating the quality of the information, as necessary.

Best Regards,

Implementing 2014 AML & ATF Regulatory Changes

We’ve done many AML Compliance Effectiveness Reviews of late, and my first question to clients is always the same: have you implemented the changes that came into effect in February of this year? The answers have varied from a confident “Yes, of course!” to “What changes?” We have a simple guideline for blogs at Outlier. If we receive a question more than three times, we write about it, and we make as much useful information as possible free. We do this because we believe that knowledge is power – and that everyone should have access to it. In the spirit of making knowledge free and available, we’ve decided to share the most significant changes related to updates to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR) that came into effect earlier this year, and the solutions that we’ve implemented with our clients.

The Big Disclaimer

This blog was not written by a lawyer and shouldn’t be considered legal advice.

While our solutions have been reviewed by:

  • Outlier;
  • Our clients who have implemented these solutions; and
  • The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) (in the form of examinations conducted with our clients who have implemented these solutions),

this doesn’t guarantee that these solutions will be a perfect fit for your business. They will need to be edited and customized to suit your business model – but we think that they will point you in the right direction.

2014 PCMLTFR Changes In Brief

The most recent changes to the PCMLTFR came into effect in February of this year. Among the most significant changes were:

  • The addition of business relationships;
  • The addition of customer information updates (with more frequent updates for higher risk customers);
  • The addition of delivery channels to the risk assessment (bundled with products and services); and
  • The addition of enhanced transaction monitoring for higher risk customers.

Each of these changes has an impact on your anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-terrorist financing (ATF) program. They should be incorporated into your program documents (your policies, procedures and training) and have an impact on your operations (what you’re doing to meet these obligations).

Business Relationships

Reporting entities have a business relationship when a customer has performed any combination of transactions that requires identification and/or confirming the existence of an entity more than twice. This includes suspicious transactions and attempted suspicious transactions. When you have a business relationship with your customer, you must keep a record of the “purpose and intended nature of the business relationship.” In its simplest form, this means asking the customer the purpose of their business with you, and keeping a record of the response. This information is also useful in transaction monitoring, as it allows you to look for activity that isn’t consistent with the answer that the customer has provided.

This is something that you can ask your customer verbally (by phone is fine), by email, via a web form, by fax, or in any other way that makes sense for your business. You don’t need the customer to sign anything, but you do need to document the response. There is also flexibility in how you keep a record of the customer’s response.

If you have flexible information technology (IT) development, you can add a business relationship indicator to your system, as well as a field for the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. Ideally, the system would detect business relationships automatically, and prompt your staff to collect information about the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. If your business is relatively straightforward, you may even be able to develop a dropdown menu.

If your IT systems are less flexible, you’ll need to find another way to record this information. This can range from notes in the customer profile section of your client management system to an excel spreadsheet. Whichever method you use, you’ll need to think of a way to make sure that you know about all of the business relationships that exist.

You’ll also need to add a section to your program documentation that explains:

  • What a business relationship is;
  • How you know when you have a business relationship with your customer; and
  • What you do when there is a business relationship.

Your staff and agent training should also be updated to include a definition of business relationships, and your processes where you have a business relationship with your customer.

Here’s some sample language:

Business Relationships

We have a business relationship with anyone that has conducted two or more transactions that require identification (for individuals) or confirmation of the existence of an entity (for organizations). When we have a business relationship with our customer, we need to keep a record of the purpose and intended nature of their business relationship with us. Although this may seem self-evident, it is something that needs to be recorded.

Our system has been updated to prompt all staff to enter the purpose and intended nature of business relationships. This field is not optional; it must be completed whenever we have a business relationship with our customers.

We must also monitor business relationships that and keep information up to date (including customer identification, if the customer is active with us). The Compliance Officer will determine whether or not information about our customers and/or businesses relationships is up to date may contact staff for additional information.

Information Updates

Reporting entities must also keep customer information up to date. Updates should be more frequent for high-risk customers, although the PCMLTFR does not specifically prescribe how often these updates should take place. Depending on your business model and how frequently you interact with your customers, there may be significant differences in how often you perform updates.

Customer information updates refer to the customer’s name, address, email address, telephone number and occupation or principal business. Customers that are organizations are also required to confirm the organization’s beneficial ownership and director information.   This doesn’t mean that you need to collect the articles of incorporation (or other documentation that you’ve already got on file) a second time, but rather than you’re confirming with the customer that this information has not changed, or updating your records if there were any changes.

Once again, if your IT systems are flexible, you can add automatic prompts to ensure that this is completed. Anyone that uses online banking will be familiar with this the type of updates that have occurred this year. When you log into your account, you’re asked to confirm your personal details before proceeding to the banking site.

You’ll also need to add a section to your program documentation that explains:

  • What information must be updated;
  • How frequently this information is updated; and
  • How you update this information;

Your staff and agent training should also be updated to include information updates as well.

Here’s some sample language:

Customer Information Updates

Customer information updates refer to the customer’s name, address, email address, telephone number and occupation or principal business.

Customers that are organizations are also required to confirm the organization’s beneficial ownership and director information.

Inactive Customers

Inactive customers are re-identified in order to re-activate an account and conduct transactions that require identification.

Inactive customers that are required to be re-identified are also required to update their customer information.

Low & Medium-Risk Customers

Low and medium-risk customers that were identified face to face are required to update their customer information at the point that the identification document has expired.

In the case that there is no expiry date for the identification document initially provided, customer information is updated every five years.

In the case that the customer has been identified using non-face-to-face methods, customer information is updated every five years.

Low and medium-risk customers that are not recognized visually or by voice must be re-identified using either face to face or non face to face methods when they request transactions that require identification.

High-Risk Customers

High-risk customers are required to update their customer information every two years.

High-risk customers that are not recognized visually or by voice must be re-identified using either face-to-face or non face-to-face methods when they request transactions that require identification.

If the reason that a customer has been considered high-risk relates to doubts about the veracity of any of the information or identification provided, additional identification or confirmation of customer identification may be required at the Compliance Officer’s discretion.

Risk Assessment: Delivery Channels

Your Risk Assessment (that document that describes the risk that your business could be used to launder money or finance terrorism) already describes the risk related to your products and services (what you sell). This has been updated to include delivery channels (how you deliver your products and services to your customers). This should include all of the methods that you use to interact with your customers (whether they’re sales and service or service only), and a description of the risk associated with those methods. Generally speaking, high-touch delivery methods (anything that allows you to interact directly with the customer) provide more opportunities to detect potential money laundering or terrorist financing activities. This doesn’t mean that low-touch options like online ordering are bad, but it does mean that you need to have good controls in place to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.

Your Risk Assessment should be updated to describe your “Products, Services and Delivery Channels” (rather than simply “Products and Services”). It should clearly explain how your products and services are delivered, and the risks associated with your delivery methods. The delivery methods should include all of your touch points with your customers (including things that may not be advertised, that you only do for existing customers).

Here’s some sample language:

Delivery Channels

We complete the sales process with our customers:

  • In person (at our retail/commercial locations);
  • In person (at locations other than our own premises);
  • Via mail;
  • Via phone;
  • Via fax;
  • Via internet.

In addition, we provide servicing to our customers:

  • In person
  • Via social media sites;
  • Via email; and
  • Via phone.

Our delivery channels include a mix of “high-touch” and “low-touch” options. High touch options provide us with greater opportunities to interact with our customers, observe customer behavior and ask questions. Low-touch options do not afford the same opportunities to observe behaviours. In these cases, we are more reliant on transaction monitoring and transaction review to detect unusual activity. In the case of low-touch options, we are generally able to contact the customer via our servicing channels to request additional details where the transaction is not consistent with what we know about the customer.

Enhanced Transaction Monitoring

Reporting entities are required to monitor transactions in order to identify patterns that may indicate that money laundering or terrorist financing is taking place. For higher risk customers, there must be some form of enhanced transaction monitoring. Enhanced means that it is different from the transaction monitoring that takes place for all customers. It can be different either in quality (what you do to monitor transactions) or quantity (how frequently monitoring takes place, or how unusual a transaction must be in order to generate an alert).

If you have an IT system that automatically monitors transactions and generates alerts, and there is flexibility in programming this system, you can make changes to the monitoring activities that take place based on customer risk level. If you’re monitoring transactions manually, you can incorporate enhanced transaction monitoring into the enhanced due diligence that you conduct for your high-risk customers. This can be as simple as reviewing the last two years of high-risk customer activity. Regardless of the method that you use to conduct enhanced transaction monitoring, you’ll need to update your program documentation to describe what you’re doing and what records you’re keeping.

Where transactions are monitored by an IT system, the language in your program documents should reflect the parameters set in your system. If you are monitoring transactions manually, here’s some sample language:

Enhanced Transaction Monitoring

For high-risk customers, enhanced transaction monitoring is conducted. The Compliance Officer (or a delegate) reviews the information that is on file about the customer, as well as records of the customer’s activity for the past two years. If there is activity that appears to be related to money laundering or terrorist financing, appropriate reports are filed with FINTRAC (and in the case of terrorist property, with CSIS and the RCMP).

High-risk customer accounts are reviewed at least annually, and more frequently where triggered by customer activity (for example where there is an internal report submitted to the Compliance Officer). The Compliance Officer will maintain complete records of the reviews and maintain these records for at least five years

Keeping Up To Date

Remember to document the fact that you’ve reviewed and updated your program. This can be done in a simple spreadsheet, or within the program documents. The record should include what updates were completed, when the updates were completed, and by whom the updates were approved.

Need A Hand?

If you need assistance reviewing your program, implementing the updates described in this blog, or just someone to chat with to make sure that you’re on the right track please contact us.

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